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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study o-f collision cases, with particular 
reference to END-QN collisions at sea.
The main section deals with 10 collision cases. They are 
summarised in such a way as to serve as the basis for 
teaching materials, when teaching the collision 
regulations for prevention of collision at sea to the 
students of the Merchant Marine Academy in Libya. In each 
case Rules violated and lessons learnt are highlighted. 
Rules concerned here are The Rules Of The Road <C0LREG).
This study of END-ON collisions has shown that the 
collision rules dealing with this particular type of 
encounter are frequently ambiguous and consequently cause 
some confusion. In light of this fact these rules are 
explained and emphasized in order to ensure their proper 
understanding by the students studying the RULES OF THE 
ROAD.
One of the main factors likely to affect the incidence of 
ship collision is the human factor, which is considered in 
Chapter (IV). The problems faced in analysing this factor 
and some practical measures to reduce the risk of 
collision are presented.
The final chapter is a summary of lessons learnt and a 
recommendation for how the investigation of colisions can 
serve the teaching of marine personnel. The need for 
global co-operation is emphasized in this connection.
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COLREG The International Regulations -for the 
Prevention of Collision at Sea, 1972
CPA Closest Point of Approach
C.S.T. Central Standard Time i.e.
(Greenwhich Mean Time + 6 hours)
CAS Collision Avoidance System
deg. degrees
D.R. Dead Reckoning Position
E/R Engine Room
G.M.T. Greenwhich Mean Time
G.R.T. Gross Registered Tonnage
hr*. hours
Kts. Knots
L.O.A. Length Over All
M.V. Motor Vessel
M.S. Motor Ship
M.S.O. Master Standard Orders
\
0.0. W. Officer Of the Watch
PAD Possible Area of Danger
p. d.V, power driven vessel
PI Parallel Index
STBD Starboard side
TSS Traffic Separation Scheme




The world’s merchant fleet has grown dramatically over 
the years. Ships are today generally larger and faster and 
carry a greater variety of cargoes, some of which pose 
health hazards and are associated with risk of fire and 
explosion, and pollution of the marine environment. The 
seas are more crowded today and consequently the risk of 
collision has increased.
The past few decades have seen many ships involved in 
collisions, founderings and incidents involving 
pollution(1). Several measures and efforts have been taken 
by concerned parties in the maritime field to prevent 
similar accidents from reoccurring. Unfortunately, such 
safety measures are often taken only after a disaster or 
catastrophe. In other words, most safety measures have 
been developed frqm the lack of safety.
Two questions arise here. First, is it essential to have 
an accident in order to improve safety standards? Second, 
are those accidents which have already occurred in the 
past not enough to learn from?
The answer to the first question is obviously "NO" due to 
the fact that most accidents have a human element among 
their causes and that the human in particular is subject 
to unpredictable errors which safety standards may not be 
able to remedy. We can improve all technical equipment 
related to safety (on board vessels as well as ashore) but 
even if we succeeded ia doing so, an uncertainty about the 
influence of the human factor would still remain.
1
The answer to the second question is difficult to find and 
that is because the real causes of many accidents are not 
clear, especially when the human factor is involved. This 
is due to the fact that persons involved in accidents 
often avoid giving true explanations or simply may not be 
able to.
This tendency is of course natural, as they try to protect 
themselves by hiding facts or destroying evidence that may 
be used against them. They may also not be able to 
correctly recollect the events which have led to an 
accident. Another reason should not be forgotten, namely 
that the crew involved, in addition to protecting 
themselves, may also try to protect the interests of their 
owners with regard to insurance and underwriting.
Moreover, a normal investigation is usually a long process 
and many facts may have been forgotten by the time the 
indivi.dual is questioned.
Thus it will never be possible to eliminate all accidents 
at sea but they can be kept to a minimum. This is where 
the maritime education and training can play a crucial 
rol e.
In every accident there will always be a cause or causes, 
most of which can be attributed to human errors or 
mistakes. Proper analysis of the accident on the basis of 
sufficient data will surely reveal some or perhaps all of 
these causes and errors.
2
SCOPE AND kltJlIQIiQNS OF IHIS DISSERTATION
As mentioned before it is not easy to find the causes, 
nevertheless many of the reports which are available now 
contain quite a lot of causes and many lessons can be 
learnt from them. Thus they can be used for teaching 
marine personnel.
The original intention of the auther was planning to write 
about lessons that can be learnt from collisions in 
teaching marine personnel. But because of the secrecy and 
restrictions imposed on disclosing the casualty reports it 
was not possible to collect a sufficent number of reports 
to cover all classes and types of collisions.
By looking randomly into the reports which were avaliable 
it was found that one type of encounter, namely END-ON 
collisions, was the most prevailent in restricted 
visibility. Moreover in a paper written by A.N.Cockcroft, 
"Collision statistics and analysis of the causes of 
collision", it was shown that 90 of approximately 750 
collision cases, about which he was able to collect 
information, involved vessels proceeding in opposite or 
nearly opposite directions, in particular, in restricted 
visibility(2).
In some collision cases it appeared that to a certain 
extent it seems that the Rules dealing with this type of 
encounter" whether in clear or restricted visibility" 
cause mariners quite a bit of confusion.
A close look at the collision cases revealed that in some, 
the 1960 Rules apply and in others the 1972 Rules apply.
3
Though the di-fferences are not great, in order to remove 
any excuse that may arise because o-f the new or old Rules, 
it was decided to restrict the study to collision cases 
which occurred a-fter the 1972 Rules came into force, i.e. 
after 1977.
It seems that the new International Regulations for the 
Prevention of Collision at sea (COLREG), together with the 
introduction of Traffic Separation Schemes(TSS)<3), has 
reduced dramatically the number of collisions specially 
the head-on encounter. Because of the reduction of 
collisions an insufficent number of cases were available, 
and if any collision has taken place in the last 10 years 
there are some problems in obtaining the investigation 
reports. The following are some of the reasons that the 
investigation reports are difficult to get hold of:
There are two types of investigation, namely governmental
investigations and civil actions. The first type normally
\will be a one-sided investigation and this is generally 
not enough to establish the real cause(s) of the accident. 
Moreover these reports are normally sent to IMO and the 
policy is to keep them confidential. If they are 
disclosed, then they are distributed to the governments 
concerned and it is not easy to obtain them.
The second type of investigation, i.e civil actions, is 
not the one from which we can expect to see reports due to 
the fact that most of the cases, over 90 X, are settled 
outside the court and therefore the investigation will 
never be brought to light.
The considerable costs and extensive time needed to 
conduct investigations make some governments reluctent to
4
initiate them. In some countries there are no 
investigations at all, though lliO is encouraging all 
member countries to conduct casualty investigations, 
specially in cases -from which safety measures might emerge 
and consequently some rules or amendments to existing 
Rules can be made.
Some administrations do not like to-disadvantage their own 
ships by publishing the investigation reports. The problem 
is also the same when the two ships are carrying the same 
flag, as they might be under different insurance policies 
and/or a difference of interest between the charterer and 
the owner in case of chartered ship is involved.
The language in which these reports is written may not 
always be English and this makes it difficult to obtain 
the vast number of cases which are written in other 
languages than English. For all the above mentioned
reasons It was not possible to collect a sufficient number
\
of cases.
In this paper the intention is to look at the 
investigation of END-DN collisions, and some specific 
cases will be mentioned to illustrate how lessons from 
such an investigation can be used for teaching ship 
personnel.
Reference will be made to the specific rule which deals 
with such encounters, namely Rule 14 (Head-on Situation). 
In addition Rule 19 (Conduct of vessels in restricted 
visibility) will be looked at, since it is the only Rule 
which governs all type of encounters in restricted 
visibility. Some explanation of these Rules will be given 
in light of the collision cases available, together with
5
the way they should be taught. But be-fore proceeding a -few 
points should be noted regarding the casualty reports:
REPORTS QN INVESTIGATIONS INJQ COLLISION
These reports concerning 10 collision cases. They are trom 
Liberia, USA, and Australia, and the first thing which may 
be noticed about these reports is that they are all 
written in a different way, even those which are issued by 
the same administration.
For example in one report some details of the ships 
involved are available and in some others they are not. 
Also the sequence of the reports can vary, meaning that 
events are not organized in the same manner. Moreover it 
was noticed that in some reports emphasis is put on one 
part of the investigation e.g. events before the collision 
or after the collision, and in the others emphasis is put 
on something else.
The next step taken was the planing of a format which 
would provide the minimum amount of data about the ships 
involved, and about the accident circumstances to enable 
us as educators (or others dealing with statistics, etc.) 
to have a clear picture of a particular collision. This 
format will appear before every case.
The cases themselves are summarized in such a way that 
they can serve the teaching of a certain number of Rules, 
rather than illustrating whose fault it was. Each case is 
also made clearer with the aid of a diagram which is 
unfortunately not a precise one due to the fact that data 
surrounding the accident, e.g. times, bearings, distances.
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given by crew members of one ship involved may differ from 
those given by others. Nevertheless these diagrams may 
serve for the purpose of education.
Having the human element as the main factor in collisions, 
considerations will be given to the problems faced in 
analysing this element and some practical measures 
proposed in this respect.
At the end of the paper there will be a conclusion on this 
research.
Notice; (1), (2),
Reference is made to indicate the attached Tables 
and Figures at the end of this Chapter.
Figure (a): Merchant ships totally lost consequent upon 
casualty 1976—1986, page 7(a). Source; Lloyds Register 
Casualty Returns, 1986
Table (b)s Numbers of collisions according to encounter 
situation and visibility for different regions. Source; 
Cockcroft A.N. Analysis of Collision Cases for the years 
1967-1977, page 7(b)
fc!Sti££l (3)
Reference is made to the Appendix at the end of 
this paper page 107; The Effectiveness of Ship 
Routing off North West Europe; Cockcroft A.N.
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N.W.Europe 8 18 23 23
Japan 3 24 40 24
Other areas 7 26 21 14
Totals vlB 68 84 61
RESTRICTED
VISIBILITY
N.W. Europe 65 132 19 14
Japan 52 107 19 2
Other areas 26. 56 4 5





Ship "A" Ship "B”
Ship*« ESCfeiEtSliCS
Name : PENNSYLVANIA BETTY (PG) WORLD NOBILITY <WN)
Flag : Liberia Liberia
Type : OBO b/c
G.R.T. I 34931 22816
L.O.A. I 799 -ft. 623 -ft.
Year o-f built i 1978 <re-built 73) 1967
Maximum draft * - —
Loading condition : loaded loaded
Max. service speed : 15 kts. 14 kts.
Bridge team nationality : - -
Additional -factors cont­
ributing to the accident: - -
Location o-f bridge. : a-ft a-ft
Engine control : E/R E/R
Accident circumstances
Day - Month - Year. 
Time
Time of the day 
Position
t 29 December 1978
t 1818
: night






t North 2-4 kts. 
t good
Type of encounter 
Speed
Rules violated
I meeting end-on / crossing 
I A(12) & B(4.2) 
e 5, 7, 10(f), 15, 16, 34
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THE CASE ;
This accident was between two ships in a congested area 
near the mouth of the Chesapeak Bay. The outbound ves­
sel <WN!) on a course 147, with a speed of 4.2 knots and 
the inbound vessel (PG) on a course 312, with a speed of 
12 knots, sighted each other at a distance of about 4 and 
1/2 miles, which is nearly reciprocal heading.
Both ships had a navigational watch consisting of master, 
chief officer and a helmsman. The CWN) disembarked the 
pilot and the CPG> was preparing to pick up her pilot. 
h4either ship had a lookout posted nor took radar plots of 
the other. There is no convincing evidence of any attempt 
to establish radio contact between the two vessels.
Just 6 minutes before the collision (PG.') a/c 30 degrees 
to port without sounding any signal. This maneuver resul­
ted in a clearly defined crossing situation in which <PG) 
became a give way vessel. At this moment the chief offi­
cer, of (PG) went to pick up the pilot and left the Master 
and the helmsman by themselves. The Master was not aware 
of the crossing ship. The engine was not stopped or 
reversed until one to one and half minutes before the 
collision.
Only at that time the Master of CWN) recognised the 
extreme situation and ordered hard to starboard, sounded 
one blast and increased speed to accelerate his turning 




Rule 5 : failed to maintain proper lookouts.
Rule 16: being the give way vessel, she failed to take
early and substantial action to keep well 
clear.
Rule 34: failed to indicate her port turn.
<b) by both ships
Rule 7 : failure to determine risk of collision.
Rule 5 : failure to maintain proper lookouts.
LESSON LEARNT :
-When altering course in good visibility it is obligatory 
to indicate such alteration by sound signal. This is spe­
cially important when navigating in vicinity of other 
vessels and in particular in Precautionary Areas. As we 
can see in this accident when the distance was about 1.2 
finilss, the situation changed from a head-on to crossing 
situation when one of the vessels a/c to port without 
indicating such an alteration.
-Within the Precautionary Areas it is sometimes very dif­
ficult to do plotting because of the number of ships in 
the area and due.to the continuously changing situation; 
however, sighting vessels by gyro bearings and using the 
radar reflector will help.
—In this connection a Bridge—to—Bridge Radio Telephone 
will help in understanding the intention of vessels
10
involved. Therefore the owners should provide recommended 
format to their masters in how to initiate communication 
with an unidentified vessel. Moreover, this accident 
shows that the officers sometimes do not set the right 
listening channel and/or keep the volume down. Such a 
simple critisism can be of an importance.
-This accident shows also the importance of the lookout. 
As when approaching the pilot the chief officer left the 
master alone on the bridge where the latter did not 
observe the crossing vessel "because I forget about it" 
as he put it. In another words, when the officer is 
appointed to observe a certain ship, he should not be 
sent away before being replaced. To this extend the 
absence of lookouts is considerd the main and most conse- 
tive f£Ailure.
-In this accident there was a moment when the situation 
was clearly becoming a dangerous one for both masters; 







On the bridge of <LE) were only the second officer and 
one lookout. The former sighted, by naked eye, a WHITE 
LIGHT about one point on the port bow. He stated that he 
examined it more closely with bionculars and noticed that 
it was a steady white light. The echo of vessel (Gl was 
not possible to detect by radar, as later it was found 
that a radar reflector was carried on board CG), but not 
hoisted.
After several observations by eye there were no changes, 
so the OOW considered this white light as a sternlight of 
a vessel northbound. (LEI was also northbound. He decided 
to a/c to port to pass other vessel's stern. Later, on 
the course recorder it was found that such alteration was 
only for two minutes and then the ship was back on her 
course. The OOW a/c by himself with hand and the lookout 
was still on the bridge.
On resuming course the OOW realised that the white light 
was a lot closer than he had expected. Within a few 
seconds, he saw a green light under the white light and 
found out that it was a sailing boat. He then a/c 50 
degrees to STBE). A few seconds later the boat crashed 
with the ship.
<E) was heading south, under foresail only at a speed 
that was 6/7 knots . The lookout saw the light of CLE) 
and reported it to the Master, who assessed the situation 
and determined that the vessels would pass clear of each 
other and maintained his course. The Master and the loo­
kout noticed when <LE) altered her course to port but 
apparently neither person noticed that the ship had gra-
lA
dually altered her course to STBD. However, they realised 
that the ship was getting very close and at the last 
minute CG) a/c to port and soonafter to STBD. Collision 
occured at the end of such manoeuver. No sound signals 
were used by neither vessel.
RULES VIOLATED
Ca) by GRUNTER.
Rule 25 failed to exhabit "the side lights " as defi­
ned in Rule 21, namely "a red light on the 
port side and green on the STBD".
Rule 2t;a:) failed to display its radar reflector which is 
" required by ordinary practice of seamanship 
or by the circumstances of the case"
Rule 5 failed to maintain proper look-out so as to
make full appraisal of the situation and of 
the risk of collision.
Rule 34<d) failed to give light warning signal
<b) by LYSAGHT ENDEAVOUR.
Rule 8(d) failed to take the right action which should 
result in passing at a safe distance when it 
resumed the northerly course.
Rule 34 failed to sound the required signal to indicate 
its maneuver.
NOTICE :
- Rule IS was not mentioned in this investigation though 
its paragraph (a) states that a power driven vessel 
underway shall keep out the way of a sailing vessel. The­
refore it was the obligation of <LE) to keep clear of <G)
15
- In this accident it appears that the white light 
sighted by CLE) had caused the OOW a confusion to acer- 
tain the type and the movement of the other ship in the 
absence of its echo on the radar screen. In the investi­
gation report it was stated that the source of the white 
light sighted by <LE.) , may have been the port side light 
showing white, or the all round anchor light on top of 
the lantern.
- their is no specific requirement in the Rules to disp­
lay a radar reflector and when vessels are in sight of 
each other it is expected that the carraige of proper 
navigation lights will enable the OOW to assess the move­
ment of the other ship. Therefore failure of CG) to disp­
lay its radar reflector was a leser factor in the colli­
sion. Had it been displayed it may have been detected by 
CLE) radar and, if so, collision probably would not have 
occurred.
LESSONS LEARNT ;
The OOW when unsure of a situation should call the maste 
-If it has been decided to change course without certain­
ty, which is not a wise thing to do, such an alteration 
should be a bold alteration and towards the open sea. 
-When the OOW decides to alter course it is better to use 
a wheelman instead of doing the action himself so mean­
while he can observe the situation more effectively.
-In areas of hazardous navigational situations, masters 
should remain on the bridge or at least arrange for a 
bridge team, so that the OOW shall not be forced to alter 
course by himself.





• C a s e 3
Ship “A" Ship "B"
§blBlS particular*
Name > M/V REGAL SWARD (RS) S/T EXXON CHESTER <EC)
Flag 1 Liberia U.S.A.
Type t Bulk carrier Tanker
B.R.T. 1 14245 17327
L.O. A. g 175.88 m 191.42 m
Year o-f built t 1961 1952
Maximum dra-ft g 17 ft 34 ft
Loading condition 1 light condition loaded
Max. service speed t - -
Bridge team nationality t Multi nationality U.S.A.
Additional factors cont- Presence of fishing
ributing to the accident; vessels
Location of bridge. ; - -
Engine control 1 —
Accident circumstances
Day - Month - Year ; 18 June 1979
Time s• 17.13
Time of the day 1 Day light
Position t SE Cape Cod, Massachusetts, U.S.A. 1 n.m.
east of the inbound lane of the Boston ap-
proach TSS. <41 28'N 69 22'W)
Weather condition
sea I ~
wind I SE 8 knots
visibility : Dense fog
Type of encounter 1 Head on
Speed t A<12-15) Sc B<11).




(EC) had (RS!) to the left of her heading flasher at a 
distance of 7 to 8 miles. (RSI made several alterations 
to port, five degrees every time assuming that (EC) will 
still pass port-to-port(*). Course alterations:
150-1A3-138 and 133 where it remained till the moment of 
collision.
(EC), although PAD was considered to be one mile his CAS 
showed CPA of 1/2 mile. At a later stage (EC) decided to 
a/c to STBD two consecutive times to increase the CPA 
without any effect as (RS) had not changed her course to 
STBD.
When (RS) came as close as 3 miles it dissappeared in the 
sea clutter on range 3 miles; thereafter it was not pos­
sible to re-acquire the target again. No change in the 
speed of both ships and the collision occured at 1713.
REKARKS
(*) In the end-on situation (meeting on nearly reciprocal 
courses) it was not logic for (RS) to alter course to 
port assuming that (EC) will pass port-to-port. The rea­
son of such action was not mentioned in the investigation 
report.
- (EC) used CAS, but no radar plot was being maintained 
other than penci1 -marking.
- the time required to update information under the CAS 
data course and speed varies inversely with the extent of 
any changes in the course and speed of other vessel.
- at the time of collision the following personnel were 
on their respective bridges:
19
CEO bridge: master, third officer, helmsman and a look­
out on the bow.
CRS) bridge: master, chief officer, 2nd/officer,helmsman 
and a lookout on the port wing.
— CEO speed was 11 knots, however, the Doppler log sho­
wed 9.9 knots which was the speed input to the CAS.
— at 1701 and 1708 CRS) tried to contact CEO by VHP but 
no answer was received.
— from 1400 till the time of collision, the navigation of 
both vessels was hampered by the presence of many fishing 
vessels in and around, crossing, and otherwise running 
contrary to the traiffic scheme.
— CRS) sank and lost cargo valued at 3.5m USD in 25 minu­
tes .










went in the wrong direction of the traffic.
maintained excessive speed in fog.
failed to maintain a proper lookout.
made assumptions based on scanty radar
information.
failed to take action in ample time, 
made a succession of small course 
alterations.
2- CEO violated the following rules:
Rule 19 Cb) maintained excessive speed in fog 
Rule 19 Cd) failed to take action in ample time.
20
Rule 19 <e) failed to take the way off when it became 
apparent that she could not avoid a close 
quarter situation.
Note: it was mentioned in the report that Rule lA was in 
violation because of the alteration of course to port by 
CRS). This is in my opinion not justified since it was 
restricted visibility and Rule 14 applies only to vessels 
in sight of each other.
LESSON LEARNT:
—Navigating with D.R. as the only means of position fix­
ing had lead to enter in the wrong direction in the TSS . 
-This accident shows the importance of passage planning. 
-It shows also that radar plotting is essevitial .
-Improper communication, i.e. not identifying the ship 
with which you want to communicate, led to a lack of rep­
ly from the other vessel.
-It is wise to allocate a lookout in the fore part of the 
ship specially in dense fog.
-This accident highlights the importance of bridge team­
work. As we have seen, though there were two officers 
present on the bridge, they were not exercising any navi­
gational functions. The captain was conning the ship, 
doing the navigation, acting as a radar observer, and VHP 
operator. Several functions which can not be executed 
propably by one person.
-Relative motion on the radar screen can not be evaluated 
by naked eye alone without plotting.
-Small course alteration does not immediately register on 
the radar plot of the other ship.
—Alteration of course should not be based on scanty radar
21
information.
-Action, if any, shall be in ample time.
.—One must not forget that the engine telegraph on the 
bridge is there to be used if needed.
—When you are not sure of the situation and you see that 
it is developing very fast it is wise sometimes to take 
al1 the way off.
-This accident shows the need for an efficent watch keep­
ing practice.
—Owners should be blamed for the weaknesses of navigatio- 
ricil organisation of the ship.
—When the target is lost on the radar screen you must not 
















Year of built : 
Maximum draft : 
Loading condition : 
Max. service speed : 
Bridge team nationality : 
Additional factors cont­
ributing to the accident: 















Da>' - Month - Year 
Time
Time of the day 
Position





sea ^ : -
wind I -
visibility : fog




A(18) 8< B(12-13) .
5, 6, 7(b), 8<a)5k(b>.
S4
THE CASE;
<L) wanted to arrive at her distination at a certain time 
so the Master decided to adjust his speed from 21 to IS 
kts. Shortly after 0000 hrs., when the ship had been in 
fog for two hours, the steering was changed from automa­
tic to hand. The lookout was put on the wheel and was not 
substituted.
On course 063 an echo was picked up dead ahead at a 
distance of six and a half miles ( radar was kept onS 
miles range ). No plotting was made. Five minutes later 
the echo was still dead ahead and at a distance 4 miles. 
At this point the Master a/c 2D degrees to STBD. Three 
minutes later the echo was still on a collision course, 
and the Master a/c a further 20 degrees, when the distan­
ce was two and a half miles. Six minutes letter the Master 
sighted CB) bearing 7 points off his port side at a 
distance of 2 cables. The collision occurred one minute 
after that. These times and distances show that the two 
sh-ips were closing at 30 kts.
REMARKS;
- The investigation report of CB) is not available, howe­
ver, it seems that she must have altered her course to 
port and her speed was between 12 and 13 kts.at the time 
of collision.
- From the statement of the master of CL) it seems that 
the echo of CB) disappeared in the sea clutter on his 
radar, thus if the large radar had been put on the 4 mile 
range when CB) was 4 miles off, a better picture of the 
other vessel's course would have been seen, and the 
effect of clutter minimized.
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RULES VIOLATED;
Rule 7 Cb) f ai led to
Rule 8 (a) f ai led to
Rule 8 Cb) f ai led to
Rule 6 f ai led to
Rule 5 f ai led to
make a proper use of radar, 
take action in ample time, 
make a large alteration of course 
proceed with safe speed, 
maintain a proper lookout.
NOTICE;
The violation of the last two Rules C6 & 51 was 
considered in the report as a contributing cause of the 
accident, though they are in fact the most consetive.
LESSON LEARNT:
-This accident shows the need for a proper use of radar 
equipment, long-range scanning to obtain early warning of 
the risk of collision and the necessity of plotting.
-A -succession of small alteration of course and/or speed 
should be avoided since they constitute action which can 
not be detected by the other vessel. Such action shall be 
positive and in ample time.
-When the lookout is put on steering he shall be replaced 
by a new lookout it is even wiser to station one lookout 
forward and another in the wing so that eyes and ears can 
be used to the best advantage.
-In this accident ,it appeared that the Master had exer 
cised in the past some maneuvers with small course alte­
rations, and since they were completed safely he conti­
nued to repeat the same procedures. In practice this is 




Ship "A" Ship "B"
Sblsll particulars
Nam^ : M/T VENDIL M/T VENPET
Flag 1 Liberia Liberia
Type t VLCC VLCC
G.R.T. X 152327 152372
L.O.A. 1 1115 ft. 1115 ft.
Year of built X 1973 1973
Maximum draft X 80 ft. -
Loading condition X loaded bal1ast
Max. service speed I 15/16 kts. 15/16 kts
Bridge team nationality X R.0.China R.0.China
Additional factors cont- Presence of f.V/Ls.
ributing to the accidenti - -
Location of bridge. X aft. aft.
Engine control X E/R control E/R control
Accident circumstances
Day - Month - Year X 16 December 1977
Time X 0930 or 0940
Time of the day sa day light
Position I 25 n.m. off the coast of South Africa




visibility 1 dense fog
Type of encounter X end on
Speed X A(13.5> & B(13.5) •
Rules violated X 5, 6, 7, 8, 19, 35(a).
THE CASE;
This accident was between two sister ships approaching 
each other in reciprocal courses in dense fog. VENOIL was 
heading west and when her 0.0.W first observed VENPET, 
her sister ship was slightly to his port bow at 22 miles.
VENOIL was making 13 kts. and expected a beam distance of 
the other vessel to be D.5 to 0.7 mile. This distance was 
changing very slightly.
The Master of VENOIL was on the bridge several times but 
at the critical time only the 3rd. officer and the helm­
sman who was on the wheel were there. The helmsman had 
executed two small course alterations to STBD according 
to the 3rd.officer's instructions. No lookout was posted, 
no reduction of speed and not even st^^nd-by notice was 
given to the engine room crew. Moreover no plotting was 
made nor a fog signal sounded.
VENPET first observed VENOIL at a distance of 13 miles 
dead ahead. On 7 miles she expected STBD to STBD passage 
and consequently she a/c twice to port, 5 degrees each 
time. Her reasons were that VENOIL had moved from dead 
ahead to the STBD bow and that her crew observed the pre­
sence of some spots not very far away on the STBD bow, 
which were probably fishing vessels. However, this was 
not proved.
The Master later came to the bridge and saw on the radar 
that VENOIL was A miles away, but made no comments on the 
3rd. officer's maneuver. 10 minutes later the collision 











failed to practice the ordinary seamenship by
setting a different course C this was not
regarded as a contributary cause but merely
set the stage for what subsequently occured.
failed to maintain a proper lookout
failed to proceed with safe speed
failed to plot their radar observations
failed to take a positive action.
failed by executing small alteration of
course to port (VENPET)
failed to sound the fog signe-il
LESSONS LEARNT:
-Vessels should comply with the COLLREG. when navigating 
in reduced visibility.
-Vessels should maintain a continuous radar observation 
and- plotting.
-No assumption shall be made on the basis of scanty radar 
information.
-Vessels should determin if a close quarter situation is 
developing.
—It is important to develop radar competence and a bridge 
team approach in close encounters, so as to eliminate all 
too frequent one-man navigational errors.
—In this accident .one of the masters gave an excuse that 
he was not familiar with the radar set. Companys procedu­
res should encompass rules which ensure that officers are 
familiar with the equipment in order to prevent reoccur­
rence of similar incidents.
-In congested areas there is a need for TSS to control
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the traffic flow.
—Adminstrations should make sure that officers onboard 
their ships have completed courses in the use of radar. 
-It appeared that the tendency of vessels to navigate 
within the winter zone limit can cause an increase in 
head-on encounters. Together with this tendecey, the 
South Africa rules governing tankers navigating in its 
water to keep a distance of > 12 miles have to be re-con- 
sidered. For the navigator it is good to understand and 
to expect such encounters.
-When the lookout is asked to steer he shall be replaced. 
—It has been noticed in this accident that though the 
Master of one of the vessels had visited the bridge seve­
ral times, he left the OOW alone in the critical moment. 
-In the absence of a public address system, the O.O.W. 
should always know how to contact the Master and where to 
find him.
—The two sets of radars onboard shall be of a different 
frequency to over come disturbance and to enable the 
bridge team to make use of both radars.
-TKis accident shows the importance of passage planning 
in that when drawing tracks they shall not place the ves­
sel in the normal routes where other vessels are using in 
the counter way.
-This accident shows the importance of fog signals as a 
method to alert other vessels.
-To comply with the safe speed difinition, the engine 
shall be put on stand-by in a such manner that any reduc­
tion of speed can^be immediately effected.
-This accident highlights the importance of communication 
and the need to use Walkie-talkie as a back up system in 
case of any failure in the main system.
-From the CPA table it can be seen that with the small 
alteration of course the passing distance was not more
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than two cables, which is not a safe distance specially 
for the size and type of vessels involved.
-Part of a master's duties, is to ensure that officers 
onboard are properly instructed. They should also ensure 
that C0LLRE6 and the company's standing orders are 
strictly observed.
—When the Master came to the bridge and found that his 
ship was entering into a close quarter situation accor­
ding to information received from the OOW, he should have 
reconfermed such information himself and not to relied on 
what he had been told.
—Owners when issuing written instructions should exercise 
all reasonable care to see that they are carried out. 
-'■From this accident it can be seen that the owners failed 
to ensure safety of navigation onboard their vessels.
-Owners should:
* ensure that their officers possess sufficient capabi- 
1 ity.
* provide them with periodical radar refresher courses.
* .take steps to require masters onboard to ensure that 
his officers are up to standard, and that masters are 
carrying out the company's stsmding orders and to ask 
them to lay down a standing procedure so that the O.O.W. 
can locate the master in case of emergency.
* assess the relative priorities between routine ship 




. C a B e 6
Ship "A" Ship “B"
SblBll particulars
Name : EASTERN ROSE (ER) PETRA (P)
Flag 8 Liberia Greek
Type 1 B/C B/C
G.R.T. •a 9060 23148
L.O.A. t - -
Year of built 8 1975 1976
Maximum draft 8 9.8 m -
Loading condition 1 Loaded Partly loaded
Max. service speed •• 17.32 Kts. 15.5 kts.(s.speed)
Bridge team nationality t
Additional factors cont­
ributing to the accident:
Korean
Location of bridge. 8 Aft
Engine control 8 E/R control
Accident circumstances
Day - Month - Year 8 04 March 1977
Time 8 13.44
Time of the day 8 Day light
Position 8 33 24’N 135 37’E





Type of encounter 8 end on
Speed 8 A<12.5) & B<15>.
Rules violated 8 5, 6, 7f 8(e), 35(a).
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THE CASE :
A collision between (ER) and CP) in which no details ar^e 
available about the investigation of CP), however, the 
investigation of CER) provides the following informations
In dense fog CER) was heading on a westerly course at 
full speed and sighted two echos, one port and the other 
on her STBD bow at distances of 9 and 10 miles respec­
tively and closing. The fog signal was used and in the 
bridge was the Master, duty officer C2nd officer) and 
helmsman. No radar plot was carried out.
As the port bow echo was closer than the STBD one, the 
Master concentrated on the closed echo, namely the port 
side. He apparently ignored the STBD bow echo, which 
appeared to be opening slightly, until he was of the opi­
nion that the port echo was passing clear. At this time 
the STBD echo was approximately 2 to 3 miles away.
When the echo was 2 miles away the Master ordered five 
short blasts on the ship's whistle. The echo was sighted 
when it was 50 to 100 meters away and at this moment hard 
rudder was given. The collision occured just after that 
and no speed reduction had taken place.
At the time of collision CP) was apparently changing 
course to STBD from an approximate course of 100, possib­
ly in an attempt to avoid CER) and the heading was pro­
bably 185 degrees
Based on the period of time between the first echo of CP) 








failed to post sufficent lookouts
both vessels failed to proceed at safe speeds.
<P) failed to sound the fog signal.
failed to do the necessary preparation in
order to slacken the speed or to take "all the
way off"
failed to do radar plotting or eqivalent 
systematic observations in order to obtain 
early warning of risk of collision.
NOTICE
The conclusion of the investigation was based on the I960 
Rules, however according to 1972 Rules the same rules are 
considered to have been violated.
REMARKS ;
CER) sunk as a consequence of this collision, two hours 
after the collision.
LESSONS LEARNT :
-It is always necessary to make proper use of radar 
equipment.
—It is necessary to proceed at a safe speed.
-Lookouts must be.posted according to Rule 5 with no 
extra duties.
-When having two echoes ahead no priority shall be given 
to any of them before assessing the situation properly. 
-A closer echo does not mean that it is more dangerous 
than the other.
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—When navigating in reduced visibility the engine shall 
be put on stand-by and ready for immediate use.
-It was noticed that a few seconds before the accident 
both vessels sighted each other,- nevertheless due to 
excessive speed no action could prevent the collision. 
-It was not proper giving five short blasts on the ships 




Ship "A" Ship "B**
Shi.El* particularg
Name sa APPLE BLOSSOM (AB) AN TING (AT)
Flag : Liberian ‘Chinese
Type t ref.ship -
G.R.T. c 7004 -
L.O.A. 1 141 m -
Year o-f built B 1969
Maximum dra-ft t — , -
Loading condition 8 loaded -
Max. service speed 8 18-19 kts. -
Bridge team nationality : S. Korean -
Additional -factors cont- -
ributing to the accident: - -
Location of bridge. m Midship -
Engine control mm E/C -
Accident circumstances
Day - Month - Year 8 16 July 197B
Time 8 20.40
Time of the day 1 Night
Position 1 Off the coast of Algeria.




visibility 8 Dense fog
Type of encounter 8 end on or nearly so.
Speed 1 A(19.5) & B(not known).
Rules violated 8 6, 7(b), 7(c), 8(e), 19(b).
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THE CASE ;
CAB) spotted a target on the radar at a distance of 7 
miles, 6-7 degrees to port side.*. Without a proper eva­
luation of the situation the Master executed three cou­
rse alterations to STBD, and every course was kept for a 
few minutes and then back again to the original course. 
This action indicates that the Master did not understand 
the movement of the other vessel. The Master had posted a 
lookout in the forecastle and sounded the fog signal. No 
speed changes have taken place.
N.B. No details about the other vessel are available.
RULES VIOLATED i
Rule 6 failed to proceed at a safe speed.
Rule 7Cb) failed to make proper use of its radar
equipment.
Ru 1 e 7<c) failed by making an ssumption based on
scanty information.
Ru 1 e 8 Ce) failed to do the necessary preparation in 
order to slacken the speed or to take "all 
the way off" if necessary.
Rule 19Cb) failed to make her engin ready for immedia­
te manoeuverC**).
.*. The time and distance of the first observation is 
different between the Master's statement and the OOW's 
statement. The Master stated that it was 7 miles at 2020 
and the OOW stated that it was 12 mile at 2018. The 
investigation showed that the OOW's judjment is closer to 
the reality; otherwise it would appear that the other
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vessel had completely stopped or was even backing. 
(**) The violation of Rule 19(b) contradict with what was
stated in the report of inve 
sed the engine room to be on 
tnent that the high speed 
impossible for her engine
LESSON LEARNT :
tigation that (AB) had advi- 
stand-by. Perhaps it was 
maintained by (AB) made it 
to respond immediately.
-In this accident it appears that some safety procedures 
were taken because of the reduced visibility namely; 
Three lookouts were placed in the forecastle, the engine 
room was advised to be ready for stand-by, and two radar 
sets were on 16 and 6 mile ranges respectively. Neverthe­
less the speed was kept at 19.5 kts. We can imagine that 
the lookout had reported having heard the fog signal, the 
range of which is usually not more than 2 miles for ships 
> 200 meters in length "in good weather conditions".
From the time at which this signal is reported to the 
bridge to the point at which it is assessed by the OOW 
could take at least 3 minutes, considering only own ship) 
speed the distance between the two ships would be a max­
imum of one mile. Hence we can conclude that the speed 
was absolutely not safe. Moreover, having the E/R on 
stand-by will not help at such excessive speeds.
-It is important to assess the situation before changing 
course, and if needed, then a bold alteration is recom­
mended .
—This accident shows the importance of radar plotting.
It shows also that there was a lack of communication 
being exercised on the bridge. Therefore, proper communi­




Ship ''A'' Ship ‘'B’'
SbiSlS particulars
Name X STRAIT CONTAINER (A) EASTERN CORRIDOR (B)
Flag X Liberia Liberia
Type X container ship general cargo
B.R.T. X 3139 4B72
L.O.A. X 104.5 m 115.7 m
Year of built X 1972 1974
Maximum draft X 4. S9 m 7 m
Loading condition sm - -
Max. service speed X 21 kts. 14 kts.
Bridge team nationality X R.0.China R.D.China
Additional factors cont­
ributing to the accident :
Location of bridge. X - aft
Engine control X E/R E/R
Accident circumstances
Day - Month - Year 
Time
Time o-f the day 
Position
s 16 December 19B5 
s 0703 
: day light
t 90 miles east o-f Hong Kong 












X A(10.2) & B(14)
X 5, 6, 7, 8, 19(b), 19(c), 19(d), 19(d)i, 




(A) had her speed reduced -from 12 kts. to 10 kts. and her 
engine on stand-by due to thick fog. She had two radars 
<both relative motion unstabilized), one on and the other 
on stand-by. In order to fi)< the ship, range has to be 
changed from 12 to 25/48 (course was distant from the 
coast).
At 0630 the chief officer (duty officer) observed (B) at 
10 miles distance. No bearing was taken; instead he 
estimated that the target was 1 mile to STBD of his 
course, by parallel indexing lines (PI), and would pass 
STBD to STBD.
At 0640 on range 6 miles (B) was 5.8 miles off. Once again 
no bearing was taken, but the chief officer estimated a 
0.5 miles passing distance (unsing PI). He felt that 0.5 
miles was not enough so he a/c (18 deg.) to port. He put 
the autopilot on hand steering using the lookout for 
steering without replacing him.
The new course was maintained till 0658 where he observed 
on the radar vessel (B) very close then he ordered helm 
hard port and made two short blasts. (A) was struck by (B) 
at 0703. There was no plotting at all.
(B) encountered fog signal and put her engine on stand-by 
at 1824 (the day before the acident), and the fog signal 
on automatic. Radars were the same condtion as (B).
At 0400 the autopilot was put on hand steering using the 
lookout without replacing him. At 0645 the chief officer
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observed (A) on a distance o-f 4 mile range. He 
concluded that it was end-on or nearly so, accordingly he 
a/c 17 deg. to STBD. No -further observation was made till 
0655, when the target was. still dead ahead and 0.4 mile 
off. He then a/c further 20 deg. to STBD. At 0700 when he 
felt that the vessels were still closing he ordered slow 
ahead and hard STBD wheel. The collision took place at 
7003.
Notice; There were some plots attached to the report of 
investigation. They indicate that ranges taken by each QOW 
are suspect or that their memories are at fault. From 
their statments it seems that the nearest approach should 
have taken place at 0655. The diagram which is attached 
here is taking into account ony courses and speeds and is 
worked back from the time and point of collision.
RULES VIOLATED i
faild to post proper lookouts, 
proceeded with unsafe speed, 
faild to use the radar properly in order to 
obtain an early warning, 
failed to take action in ample time, 
both ships failed to proceed at safe speed, 
both ships failed to determine if a close 
quarter situation is developing by plotting 











There was a comment in the investigation report that Rule 
14 was not complied with. However, the visibility was 
dense -fog. Therefore this Rule should not apply.
lessons LEARNI 1
-This accident shows the importance of passage planning. 
-The track followed by both ships was sufficiently distant 
from the coast line to necessitate changing from the anti- 
collision range scale of 12 miles to the 24 or 48 mile 
range scale to fix the ship's position.
On board both ships involved only one radar per watch was 
used. This is a bad practice as it can lead to unsafe 
navigation.
—Again in this accident the OOW found the nearest approach 
to be too close for comfort. Therefore he changed course 
to port. Such a practice should never be done. The moment 
i± appears that CPA is small, then the course should be 
changed to STBD. Moreover in this case the ship which 
altered course to port was not restricted from changing 
course to STBD.
-As in many cases the lookout was not replaced when used 
for steering.
-It seems that the difference between signals in fog and 
in clear visibility was not clear. Therefore some stress 
on this point should be made when teaching the COLLREG.
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-Bridge doors shall be kept open in -fog, to hear signals, 
if any.
-The need for plotting to ascertain the target vessel’s 
course and speed, and to determine if a close quarter 
situation was developing, and not to rely on PI as a 
method to estimate risk of collision.
-The importance of proceeding at a safe speed.
-One of the ships had a 4-meter trim, a situation which 
may effect the radar by having a shadow sector forward.
-It was noticed in this accident that both masters were 
not on their respective bridges at the moment of the 
accident. Therefore the Master’s standing orders should 
contain such orders to have the master called when the DOW 
is in doubt of the situation.
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• C a s e 9
Ship "A'' Ship "B"
ghi.ElS particular*
Name : FEDDY SOUNION
Flag I Liberia Greek
Type 1 b/c single deck b/c
B.R.T. t 113B1 13540
L.O.A. t - 167.65 m
Year o-f built : 1962 1968
Maximum dra-ft s• - 9.5
Loading condition X - -
Max. service speed t 15 kts. 15.5 kts.
Bridge team nationality *• Hong Kong/Taiwan multi nationalities
Additional factors cont- Presence of another
ributing to the accident: vessel ahead.
Location of bridge. am aft aft
Engine control mm — —
Accident circumstances
Day - Month - Year n 10 february 1981
Time I 0725
Time of the day t day light
Position : 9 miles north of Algier
(36 54.5'N 003 04'E)
Weather condition
sea 8 calm
Mind t east 1
visibi1ity 1 dense fog
Type of encounter 8 nearly end-on
Speed e• A(10) & B(11.5>




M/S Feddy (F) sank within 30 minutes a-fter she was struck 
on her port side by M/B Sounion (S>. (F) capsized and
sank so quickly that only 3 crew members were rescued. 
There was a third ship involved in this casualty (TW).
(S) was heading West and (F) together with (TW) were 
heading East close to each other. At 0645 (S) detected 
echoes o-f two vessels on radar -from a distance o-f 17
The Master o-f (S> thougt that both ships were on 
his STBD bow, however, analysis o-f this accident showed 
that they should have been 10 degrees on his port bow.< At 
0705 the Master o-f (S) altered course 13 degrees to port.
At 0720 the Master was advised that a -fog signal was heard 
25 - 30 degrees o-f-f his STBD bow. This signal in -fact was 
-from (TW) . At 0720 he put his helm hard port, placing his 
ship on a collision course with (F).
RyLES yiDLAIED i
Rule 6 both vessels were running with excessive
speed.
Rule 7(b) the Master o-f (S) -failed to use his radar 
properly.
Rule 7(c) based his assumption on scanty radar 
in-f ormation.
Rule 14(a)&
17(c) -failed to alter course to STBD (*)
Rule 8 (b) made a succession o-f small course alterations.
Rule 8 (e) -failed to do the necessary preparation in
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order to slacken the speed or to take "all 
the way o-f-f".
Rule 19(d)(1) changed course to port.
Rule 19(b) maintained excessive speed in -fog.
BENiBAL REIjARKS
-There was a lack o-f proper communication.
-(t) In the conclusion report it was stated under 
paragraph 5:
"the Master of Sounion ignored Rules 14(a) and 17(c) by- 
altering his course to port".
I see no reason why these two Rules apply only to vessels 
in sight of each other, which is not the case here.
lesson LEARNI 1
—Even when faced with the risk of collision, some OOWS 
will not USB the technique of radar plotting to determine 
the course, speed and closest point of approach (CPA) of 
a-n approaching vessel.
-Some OOWS have not acquired sufficient skills to use 
their rader to plot as required by Rule 7(b).
-Assumptions and actions are based on scanty rader data. 
-Radar interpretation and plotting is an attained skill 
which can only be acquired through proper education, 
training and experience.
-The use of an automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) could 
eliminate or reduce this problem. But a high professional 
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Case 10
Ship "A" Ship "B"
Sblsll particulars
Name t LASH ATLANTICO (LA) HELLENIC CARRIER <HC)
Flag sm U.S.A. Greek
Type I barge carrier general cargo
G.R.T. s 26406 B987
L> ■ 0 ■ A ■ : 820 ft. 470 ft.
Year of built c 1972 1972
Maximum draft 1 32 ft. 32 ft.
Loading condition t loaded partially loaded
Max. service speed : - -
Bridge team nationality : U.S.A. Greeks
Additional factors cont­
ributing to the accident :
Location of bridge. am -
Engine control X E/R E/R
Accident circumstances
Day — Month - Year I 6 May 1981
Time 1 0702
Time of the day 1 day light
Position X 36 15*N 75 34'W





visibility 1 fog (0-1 mile)
Type of encounter I end-on
Speed X A(18) & B(14)
Rules violated I 6, 7, 8(b), 19
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Idi case :
(LA) collided with (HO in dense -fog. It was nearly end-on 
meeting. When the chie-f mate o-f (HO -first saw the echo of 
(LA) on the radar, he believed that the vessels were on 
opposite and parallel courses and would pass STBD-to-STBD 
about 2 miles apart.
Similary, when the master and second mate of (LA) first 
saw the (HO on radar, they believed that the vessels were 
on opposite and parallel courses and would pass at least 1 
mile but PDRT-to-PDRT. No plotting was carried out by 
either vessel.
(LA) course was 161 and in an attempt to increase the CPA 
a small alteration of course to STBD was made. First 165 
and then 175 and 185. However, the contact's relative 
movement was not changing to the left to increase the CPA. 
This fact should have alerted the Master and the Second 
mate that the changes of course to STBD were not aiding 
the si-tuation.
The (LA) had observed (HC) on radar 10-12 minutes prior to 
the collision, that is considered enough time to plot it 
and tp determine its CPA. However, by having the radar on 
the 6 mile range, the DOW provided himself with only a 
relatively short time period for evaluating a meeting 
situation.
15 minutes before the collision (HC) altered course 6 
degrees to port to pass (LA) more openly. This is a 
statement made by the chief officer of (HC). When the two 
ships were 3 miles apart the DOW went to STBD bridge wing 
to see (LA). He stated that the visibility was from 1.5
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to 2 miles. Although he remained on the bridge wing -for 5 
minutes, he did not see, (LA). Visibility continued to 
deteriorate, but no sound signal was used by (HO.
About one minute before the collision, the chief mate 
returned to the pilot house and looked at the radar and 
saw the echo half mile slightly aft of his BTBD beam. As 
he watched the contact, it headed directly towards him.






proceeded with unsafe speed, 
failed to do radar plotting or equivalent 
systematic observations in order to obtain 
early warning of risk of collision, 
action to aviod collision was not large 
enough.
their behaviour was not in accordance with 
the following paragraphs: b, d(i), d(ii), 
and (e).
lesson LEARNI 1
-In this accident if there had been no alteration of 
course, the two ships would have passed safely STBD to 
STBD at about 1 nm. apart. This of course can only be 
known if a proper plotting had taken place in order to 
determine course, speed, CPA etc. which was not the case 
here. As a matter of fact no plotting has been done at 
all.
-There was a conflict whether the case was BTBD to STBD or 
port to port pass. It seems that one of the ships had the 
presentation on the radar scope missaligned with the 
heading of the ship, however a plot of the movement of the 
contact should have indicated the correct passage.
-In such a case the use of VHF radiotelephones by the 
bridge watch to establish passing agreements should be 
encouraged.
—Long range scanning is very important to have some ideas 
about each other before it becomes very late.
-When the situation was hot clear it might have been of a 
help to reduce speed to a minimum until the picture was 
clear and to have additional time to evaluate the 
situation and to take any evasive action necessary to 
avoid collision.
-The fog signal should always be used when applied.
-Alterations of course should be large so they appear on 
the other vessel’s radar screen. A succession of small 
alterations of course and/or speed should be avoided.
-There should be international agreements to require 
vessels to deep listening to channel 16 particulary in 
coastal waters where there is other traffic.
-In company’s iristructions to masters, there should be 
encouragement to use both radars on ships equipped with 









End-on meetings may appear either when both vessels are 
in sight of one onother or in restricted visibility.
Here we have to deal with two different rules namely Rule 
14 CHead-on Situation) and Rule 19 (Conduct of Vessels in 
Restricted Visibility) in which the above mentioned 
situation may take place.
a) WHEN BOTH SHIPS ARE IN SIGHT OF EACH OTHER;
two
the
Rule 14 (a) states:
" When two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal 
or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of 
collision each shall alter her course to starboard so 
that each shall pass on the port side of the other "
Here the interpretation of "nearly" is necessary in 
respects:
1- to determine whether the "crossing" rule or 
"end-on" rule applies.
2- .to decide whether the "end-on" rule applies to two 
vessels approaching each other on opposite and parallel 
or nearly parrallel tracks. This latter case can be par­
ticularly difficult in green-to-green situations as alte­
ring course to starboard involves passing ahead of the 
approaching vessel.
The end-on and crossing rules are only applicable to 
situations in which vessels are in visual sight of one 
another, but even more difficult situations can occur 
when vessels out-of-sight of each other are meeting 
"nearly" end-on with a risk of a "close-quarters situa­
tion and where the radar plot is indicating an apparent 
"green-to-green" situation, and Rule 19 is imploring the 
mariner to "avoid altering course to port".
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We shall be concerned with the interpretion of the words 
"nearly" and "close-quarters", and try to find ways of 
better explaining to Rules 14 and 19.
Meeting vessels in sight of each other :
The term "nearly" in the in-sight situation is usually 
understood according to the specification of the side­
lights. Although the Collision Regulation (Rule 21) state 
that the sidelights should show from right-ahead to 22.5 
degrees abaft the beam on their respective sides, in 
reality, to avoid having a blank area ahead between the 
two sidelights owing to their usual physical separation, 
the side lights are required by the Collision Regulation 
(Annex 1, s 9 (a) (i) ) to show one to three degrees
across the bow onto their "wrong side".
The courts have suggested therefore that fine crossing 
courses intersecting at less than six degrees should be 
regarded as meeting "nearly end-on". So both vessels need 
to ^Iter course to starboard. Whereas if the intersecting 
angle is six or more degrees the situation should be 
regarded as a (crossing) one and the vessel which has the 
other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way 
while the other should keep her course and speed.Thus, by 
night, the theory is that if only one sidelight is seen 
ahead, or on either side, it is not an "end-on" situa­
tion and is probably a "crossing" situation (unless the 
other vessel is ,stopped), wheras if both sidelights are 
seen ahead, or within three degrees of right ahead, it 
is an (end-on) situation.
This apparently seems to be simple solution, however, it 
can be more' complicated when vessls on fine-crossing
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courses are yawing, and in cases where vessels appear to 
be passing green-to-green but too close for comfort. Each 
of these difficult situations has been considered by the 
Court of Appeal.
— The first case was a collision between two ships, 
Kaituna and Selje, which took place 20 miles off Cape 
Otway in southern Australia. The two vessels were yawing 
on courses intersecting at 8 degrees. The Court of Appeal 
decided that the crossing rule applied and therby over­
ruled the Admiralty Court which had held that the end-on 
meeting rule applied^*).
—The second case was a collision between the VLCC Horta 
Barbosa which was in ballast and the fully loaded VLCC 
Sea Star in the Gulf of Oman. The two ships were on 
reciprocal courses and would have passed each other green 
to green at about 0.75 to 1.0 mile apart if the Sea Star 
had not altered course to starboard. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the decision of the Admirality Court which had 
held that the end-on meeting rule did not apply to the 
case, and that the Sea Star had altered course to star­
board at an "improper" time.
Furthermore the three judges in the Court of Appeal 
accepted the advice of their two nautical assessors. 
Their advice was that if two VLCCs are in sight of each 
other and are proceeding, each at 16 knots on reciprocal 
courses, shaping to pass green to green, then they could 
pass each other safely at a minimum distance of 5 cables; 
and that if the predicted passing distance" was anything 
less than 5 cables then either or both vessels should 
alter course to port to turn away from each other -to 
increase the passing distance",<*)
*< A.G.Corbet, Seaways Nov.86)
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So the conclusion with respect to vessels in sight is 
that there will be doubt as to whether or not any parti­
cular < fine ) crossing case or any particular green to 
green < close ) passing situation will be regarded as a 
head-on situation to which 1972 Rule 14 applies.
Rule 14 Cc) states :-
" When a vessel is in doubt as to whether such a situa­
tion exists, she shall assume that it does exist and act 
accordingly."
Well, the Sea St^ir was in doubt and acted accordingly, 
but the Horta Barbosa was not in doubt. It was sure that 
the end-on rule did not apply ! so Rule 14 (c) is not 
really of any help; in fact, it misleads by pretending or 
inferring that the whole of Rule 14 copes with the doubt­
ful situation. Thus the Sea Star case piroves that it does 
not.
In an article in SEAWAYS written by Captain A.G.Corbet he 
suggested some riidical changes to Rule 14, namely:
- to permit the mariner to use his common sense when dea­
ling with a ship approaching end-on and not to be; inhibi­
ted from altering course to port specially in a close 
"green to green " passing situation.
- When altering course to put the other vessel abeam or 
even astern. So if one vessel alters course to port as 
the other alters %a starboard then there is no risk of 
collision as each vessel has the other abeam, they are on 
parallel course, and it is easy to distinguish one from 
the other.
- to establish proper procedures for reaching agreement
&1
to pass either green to green or red to red with the aid 
of VHF by broadcasting the true bearing and range of the 
echo being called with the identity of the calling ship.
- Captain Corbet critisised the Rules in that they do not 
attempt to deal with cases where more than two vessels 
are approaching each other with an equal risk of colli­
sion as the Rules, apart from Rule 9 and 10, deal with 
two vessels only.
After the study to several collision cases in which head 
on or near head on cases took place, it was found that in 
some cases it would help if such changes stated in the 
above mentioned artical were implemented. However, many 
changes in the Rules may lead to more confusion as first, 
as it takes a lot of time to bring such changes into 
being. Second, all the existing seafarers need to be 
notified of such changes which is not an easy thing to 
do.
With regard to these changes and the existing Rule 14, I 
think a proper explanation and simulation may overcome 
the ambiguity, and the following should be observed in 
teaching this Rule
- Courses which intersect in an angle of less than 6 to S 
degrees should be considered head on.
- If the starboard to starboard passing presents ambigui­
ty and mariners wish to increase the passing distance by 
altering course to port, which is against Rule 14, they 
should consider the case as head on. That means a risk of 
collision does exist and they, therfore should make an 
early and substantial alteration to starboard to achieve
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a port to port passing.
<The attached table can be of help in appreciating the 
passing distance).
— Rule 14 is not intended to apply to cases in which, 
from a vessel which is ahead or nearly ahead, one side 
light can be seen, but the other is obscured.
— The effect of yawing must be taken into account.
— Emphasis should be given to the wording of the Rule. In 
that it is the direction of the ship's head, and not the 
course made good, which must be used to determine whether 
vessels are meeting end on or crossing.
The communication process is of very much help if it can 
be done but in the absence of tranponders for a proper 
identification of vessels it might leed to confusion. See 
Diagram Cl).
CB calling A " vessel on my starboard bow 2 miles off 
course 140 speed 10 knots "resulting in no answer from A, 
but C answered the call in the beleve that D is the cal­
ling ship.
Now if the agreement was to ask A to change course to 
starboard, instead C will do so, an action which may pla­
ce her on a collision course with B).
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Finally the presence of more than one ship in a head on 
situation with the risk of collision from both of them at 
the? very same time is very rare, as the two ships aheeid 
of own ship will obviously not keep such a close distance 
to each other. However a bold alteration of own ship 
course to starboard in plenty of time with the possibili­
ty of an increase in speed may clear up the situation.
(b)WHEN BOTH SHIPS ARE NOT IN SIGHT OF EACH OTHER
Here the? situation is different from that when both ves­
sels are in sight of one another. By having a look at the 
collision regulations we will find only one rule which 
deals with conduct of vessels in restricted visibility 
namely, Rule 19. In this rule all types of encounter, 
when in restricted visibility, are dealt with. However, 
since our concern here is meeting end on or nearly end on 
situation, we will limit our discussion to this particu­
lar type of encounter.
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Rule 19 (d) states :
"A vessel which detects by radar alone the presence of 
another vessel shall determine if a CLOSE-QUARTER SITUA­
TION is developing and/ or RISK OF COLLISION exists. If 
so, she shall TAKE AVOIDING ACTION IN AMPLE TIME, provi­
ded that when such action consists of an alteration of 
course, so far as possible the following shall be 
avoided
<i) an alteration of course to port for a vessel forward 
of the beam, other than for a vessel being overtaken".
Here it is clear that in most types of encounters inclu­
ding end-on meetings all vessels should try to avoid 
alterations of course to port for vessels forward of the 
beam (except for a vessel being overtaken 1. Before going 
into details I would like first to explain the underlined 
expressions
3.1- A CLOSE QUARTERS SITUATION
The distance at which a close quarters situation first 
applies has not been defined in miles, and is not likely 
to be as it depends upon a number of factors, e.g. si^e, 
type, manoevrability of ships and weather conditions.
In restricted visibility, in the open sea, a close quar­
ters situation is generally considered to begin to apply 
at a distance of at least 2 miles in any direction for­
ward of the beam as this is the typical range of audibi­
lity for the whistle of a large vessel in still condi­
tions. A minimum distance of 3 miles is sometimes sugge­
sted when determining whether a close quarters situation 
is developing as allawance should be made for the effects 
of errors in radar observations, especially at long 
range.(*)
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3.2- DETERMINE RISK OF COLLISION
A vessel which detects another vessel by radar alone in 
restricted visibility is required to determine whether a 
close quarters situation is developing and/ or risk of 
collision exists.
Rule 7 (b) also requires that proper use be made of radar 
equipment to obtain early warning of risk of collision, 
and that radar plotting or equivalent systematic observa­
tion should’be carried out. Assumptions must not be based 
on scanty information. Here I will ellaborate on the 
dangerous of assumptions on scanty information:
The determination of risk of collision, in both clear and 
restricted visibility, must be based on several succes­
sive observations taken as accurately as possible.
Small errors in ranges and bearings taken in the early 
stage of an encounter, or inaccurate plotting, are there­
fore likely to have an appreciable effect on the asses­
sment of risk of collision.
The example in DiagrameCS) illustrate the danger of 
attempting to assess whether risk of collision exists 
from a small number of observations taken at long range. 
Errors in bearings of C+/-1 deg.) are not unlikely when 
using radar, as a result of which it may appear that the 
echo is going to cross ahead or,may appear to be going on 
a parrallel course. Therefore several observations should 
be taken at short and regular intervals to reduce the 
effect of these random errors when there is a possibility 
of a close quarters situation developing. Figer (1) shows 
how to assess risk of collision according to Rule 7
3.3- TAKING AVOIDING ACTION IN AMPLE TIME
Avoiding action must be taken if a close quarters situa­
tion is developing and risk of collision exists. It is 
not necessary to take avoiding action if a vessel is 
expected to pass at a close distance but there is no risk 
of collision as, for example, when two vessels meet in 
a channel.
Rule (8) (a) requires avoiding action to be taken in amp­
le time in all conditions of visibility. When the visibi­
lity is restricted it is generally necessary to take 
action to avoid a close quarters situation at i^n earler 
stage. However, action should not be taken without first 
making a full assessment of the situation.
As a general guide it has been suggested that, using a 12 
- mile range scale in the open sea, radar observation 
should be assessed as an approaching target crosses the. 
outer one third of the screen to see whether a close 
quarters situation is developing. If so substantial 
action should be taken before the target reaches the 
inner one third of the screen. (see Diagram (2) *
Macnai 8
llw Sw *1"*
* A. N. Cockcroft and J N F Lameijer.
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Rule (19)<d) requires avoiding action to be taken in amp­
le time if a close quarters situation is developing with 
a vessel approaching from any direction.
3.3 ACTION TO BE TAKEN i-
As I have mentioned before we are looking into meeting 
end on or nearly so. In such situations manouvring with 
speed does not help very much provided that the other 
ship does not take action. However it could be considered 
as "avoiding action" as it reduces the closing speed and 
gives more time for assessment and further action by both 
vessels. Therefore we are looking at the right action to 
be taken in such encounters.
First, as a general behaviour when dealing with Rule 
•19Cd> avoiding action, the attached chart(2) shows how 
such ru1e shall pply.
Second, in an end-on meeting the most effective action is 
alteration of course. The Rules make it clear by stating 
that vessels shall avoid an alteration of course to port 
for a vessel forward of the beam other than being overta­
ken; this includes our case of study.
By observing the two rules, namely Rule 14 C head on for 
vessels in sight of each other ) and Rule 19 < for ves­
sels in restricted visibility it can be seen that the 
action shall be. alteration of course to starboard. One 
may ask what is the problem then if it is so clear whe­
ther in clear or restricted visibility vessels shall 
change course to starboard.
The answer to that is coming from investigation of the 
several cases of collision where the situation of " near­
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ly end-on " seems to be the prevailing one. Moreover it 
seems that it always causes misunderstanding or missesti- 
mation in the case. Such ambiguty was always noticed, 
specially in cases when the other vessel was approaching 
from fine starboard bow < in restricted visibility ). In 
most of the cases it appeared to the officer of the watch 
(o.o.w.) that the bearing of the other ship was slightly 
opening, This could have been due to an error in the 
radar or the gyro, and he saw that the ship was already 
to the starboard side so he tried to increase the CPA by 
altering a few degrees to port. What often seems to hap­
pen is that the other vessel acting according to the 
Rules, perhaps not in ample time, alters her course to 
starboard. Finally it ends up in collision or near-miss.
3.§ WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?
I think if every navigator sticks to the Rules by alte­
ring course to starboard in ample time after assessing 
the situation the risk of collision will be reduced, and 
in • cases similar to the one I have mentioned before the 
following should be well explained to the students:-
1- when a certain type of encounter shall be considered 
as a Head-on situation
2- after a proper plotting If the CPA is found to be not 
enough and an alteration of course is chosen as to 
avoid a close quarter situation, then a bold altera­
tion of course »to starboard would be the right action, 
perhaps to put the other vessel astern. Engine shall 
be used without hesitation and the ship shall always 
proceed with safe speed.
3- whenever possible establishment of communication with 
the other vessel will make things clear to both ships.
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4- finally several trainings with the aid of simulators 







Every vessel shall determine i-f 
risk of collision exists by using 
all available means 







scaning to obtain 










Rule plotting ^ a systametic observation of detected 
7<b> objects with the aim to determine if risk of 
collision exists.
is plot » to mark (or to take the bearing and 
distance of) a target at regular time-intervals 
and,by graphic or computing method, to determine 








THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN COLLISIONS
In most investigations of collision cases, the human fac­
tor appears in one way or another as a prime causative 
factor. Therefore a special emphasis should be given to 
this factor if we are to reduce collisions at sea. One 
important fact is that when we talk about errors made by 
those on board ships, for example, if a. ship collides 
with'' another because of an incompetent watchkeeper, part 
of the fa-lame must rest also with the people who employed 
him or issued him with his qualification. Moreover the 
human error has to be appreciated in its broadest sense. 
That means we have to see that the error is often caused 
by other factors, that human failure has a background.
In this chapter I will be looking at some of these fac­
tors. I will illustrate the problems faced in analysing 
human failure and will propose some practical measures, 
which have to be highlighted for the maritime students at 
the education and training stage as a step forward to try 
to reduce the risk of collisions.
SOME SOCIAL PROBLEMS
In order to understand human behaviour one must ask (why 
do they behave like this?) Is it because their wages do 
not offset the discomfort and the hardships of life at 
sea, far from the family and from the amenities of life 
ashore, or is it because of the nature of the work 
on board the ship itself < extra stress from the superio­
rs ) 7
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senseIs the ship's trading route in a 
crew quite far away from home? Many 
be asked if we are to understand the 
behaviour.
keeping her 
other questions can 
reason for human
In contrast today's industralised shipping industry some­
times does not observe the social problems of life 
on board ships. Surely, the reasons are commercial ones. 
In a highly competitive shipping industry one can not 
spend time finding ways to attract men who in the end are 
too expensive and whose expectations are too high. There­
fore, many shipping companies tend to man their ships, 
whether directly or through manning agencies, without 
paying much attention to the social problems of their 
crews. But with the high percentage of human failure 
involvement in collision, the time has come to pay more 
attention. If shipowners are to seek the safety of their 
ships and to keep their reputation high, one result of 
which will be the enhancement of safety at sea and the 
contribution to the prevention of pollution arising from 
collision.
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A.I PROBLEMS FACED IN ANALYSING HUMAN FAILURE
1- In order to prevent or reduce collisions a thorough 
understanding of there causes should take place. To 
understand the causes depends upon collecting valid and 
systematic information, and since we are dealing with a 
human and social process the following problems will have 
to be considered:
1.1 The primary source of information on collision is 
people, not mechanical devices such as the airlines" 
black box Logbooks and reports are themselves subject 
to human influnce.
1.2 The scene of shipping accident does not remain the 
same.
1.3 Possibilities for reconstructing the accident and 
preceding events are limited.
l.A There is no external monitoring that can provide 
immediate and direct information as in spacecraft 
accidents where it is passible to know exactly what has 
gone wrong, how and where, and what could have been done 
to prevent the accident.
1.5 It is difficult to assess what really happened, 
because what actually happened, what is perceived as 
having happened, what later is recalled as having hap­
pened, what is communicated as having happened, and what 
is recorded in documents as having happened may differ 
significantly.
/
2- It is also noted that apart from other considerations 
such as insurance and liability, the version of collision 
given by two ships involved may not exactly tally with 
each other. Indeed they may flatly contradict each other. 
I have found it very difficult in analysing some colli­
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sion cases to establish the point of collision. The rea­
son is that following the report of each ship sometimes 
after plotting it I found out that in a such case there 
should not be any collision; instead they should have 
passed each other at a safe distance.
3— When giving the accident details some might be dropped 
and others might be added or distorted. A common excuse 
used is that of not remembering the situation specially 
after a long time has passed.
A- Willingess to communicate to others what actually 
occurred to the best of one's knowledge, one's experience 
and one's own role and contribution to events depends on 
several factors:
i - the concern about disclosing information that may 
prove harmful to oneself.
ii - the need to protect one's security.
iii- the need to protect the community C by closing ranks 
against outside threats )
5— Vying with these processes are two considerations:
i -the rational consideration: one should cooperate to 
the best of one's ability in analysing causes and disclo­
sing information even if it puts oneself in a poor light, 
ii- a duty and legal responsibility exists to communicate 
about accidents regardless of what the individual may
personally feel in the matter. •
$
6- Because of the complexity of the above mentioned prob­
lems we need to develop an appropriate methodology that 
can meet rational and legal considerations whilst also 
providing human consideration as regards the security of 
the seafarer and his community. In the meantime we have
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to look at the human process in collision-
A.2 HUMAN PROCESSES IN CASUALTIES :
A.2.1- Based on the studies of several collision cases 
the following general conelusions can be drawn;
(a) The human factor by itself should not be isolated as 
the sole cause of a collision. It has to be linked 
to other contributing factors.
<b) When finding the cause of collision we can not go 
just to the action preceding the collision and say 
this is the cause. We have to consider the previous 
events.
<c.l We should not concentrate only on serious collisions 
because we can learn as well from minor ones.
A.2.2 MAJOR FACTORS INVOLVED IN COLLISIONS ;
A.2.2.1 KNOWLEDGE. SKILL AND EXPERIENCE ;
Knowledge, skill and experience together form the basic 
requirements for safe navigation and collision avoidance. 
A collision may occur as a result from these basics not 
being acquired and maintained. In these cases there is no 
substitute for proper education, training and seagoing 
experience for the navigator. However, collisions can and 
do occur when there is a lack of knowledge, skill and 
experience of "local" conditions and it is in this area
t
that improvement may need to be sought.
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A.2.2.2 THE NO RISK ASSUMPTION ;
A number of collisions seem to derive from a "no-risk 
assumption" on the part of the ship's navigator. Natural­
ly all navigators know intellectually that some risk 
exists once ships are within certain areas. However, the 
navigator may become so accustomed to situations success­
fully handed in the past that he implicitly assumes no 
risk. At this point he is vulnerable. He may ignore or 
neglct first indications of the development of a poten­
tially dangerous situation which may result in a colli­
sion .
A.2.2.3 ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNICATION ;
Organisation and communication are propably the two main 
areas in which human factors play a role in collision 
besides qualification. Organization may be at the bridge 
level (e.g. watchkeeping ), ship level (e.g. bridge-eng­
ine room co-ordination), or ship-shore level <e.g. co-or­
dination with tugs, traffic systems or harbour authori­
ties) .
Similarly a communication breakdown may occur at any or 
all of these levels and thereby contribute to collision. 
A huge number of collisions could be quoted as reflecting 
organisational and/or communication deficiencies.
Second line systems or back-up systems can be of help, 
therefore the batf^ery system must be checked and also the 
availability of walky-talkies which have the working cha­
nnels can help in many of these cases.
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4.2.2.4 WASTER - WATCH OFFICER RELATIONS ;
The relationship between master and officer is very 
important in assessing the risk. If ,for example, a 
junior officer notices a mistake by the master but is 
reluctant to bring it to his attention for fear of show­
ing up the master, then the mistake may go unrectified 
and a collision may ensue. Or if the junior officer feels 
that the master is always looking over his shoulders he 
may feel he can never develop confidence in his own abi­
lity.
Traditionally in seafaring there has been little concern 
for such matters in the education and training of seafa­
rers. Such matters have been left to the individual 
master to work out as best he can and in light of his own 
personstlity within the formal command of the ship. It is 
necessary to reconsider this attitude and to incorporate 
subjects such as human relationship on board ships in the 
curriculum of training institutions. Perhaps bridge team 
work is the solution for such a problem.
A.2.2.5 THE EFFECT OF AUTOMATION ON THE ROUTINE JOB
"AUTO-SYNDROME" :
In practice the navigator is doing a routine job and 
performing a semi-automatic watch. In the open sea, not 
only may the steering gear be on automatic, but the 
watchkeeper's migd may go on "automatic". In this condi­
tion, for example, he may sight a vessel well up ahead in 
calm seas and clear visibility. He may adjust his course 
slightly to avoid an encounter and continue with his rou­
tines of chart checks and other matters. Suddenly he may 
find himself in trouble with the other vessel's unantici­
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pated movements and his last-minute avoiding action CLMA) 
may be insufficient to prevent a collision. The important 
point here is that the routinised nature of the situation 
and the apparent no-risk condition can lull the navigator 
into a false security putting him onto auto when he 
should be alert and aware.
4.2.2.6 MASTER PILOT RELATIONSHIP ;
Once the pilot boards the vessel, organisationally the 
situation becomes increasingly complex and different 
compared to the situation out at sea. To prevent a lack 
of co-ordination from developing between pilot and 
master, routine planning and the use of other means of 
co-ordination may be essential and establish the diffe­
rence between being involved in a collision or avoiding 
it.
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A.3 AREAS OF CONCERN OR CONTRADICTION ;
A.3.1 TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN REQUIREMENTS ;
Advanced technology has brought very sophisticated equip­
ment to the bridge. Such technology requires that naviga­
tors possess a higher level of educational and professio­
nal skills. At the same time, however, this technology 
has taken away from the professional seafarer many of his 
traditional tasks and areas of expertise and judgment. 
The navigator finds himself in a "push-button" relation­
ship to his job. This affects very much the individual's 
job content, self-esteem and sense of worth and contribu­
tion. We have to consider the technological and human 
demands together and not concentrate on technology only.
A.3.2 THE PROBLEM OF COLLISION CONSCIOUSNESS ;
Sometimes, it was felt that the seafarer can not appre­
ciate the consequences of casualties unless he has a 
direct or near miss experience of them. This does not 
mean that one can pursue a policy of being involved in 
near misses or collision as a means of increasing safety 
consciousness.
With modern methods of simulation and sociological analy­
sis one can create situations analogous to those that may 
appear at sea in which people can experience the dynamics 
of collisions as well as receive information about the
f
results of their behaviour.
• I82
A.3.3 INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION i
Technology and organization have to go along in one line. 
That is to say that despite the fact that huge investment 
is made in advancing the navigation equipment to minimise 
the role of the human component, the human factor is 
behind many accidents. Therefore, the organizational con­
cept should also be emphasized through better training, 
better methods of manning arrangements, team organiza­
tion, work distribution and planning.
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A.4 PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES
A.A.l SAFETY CONSCIOUSNESS STRATEGY ;
Safety consciousness can be promoted by lectures, discus­
sions, seminars, films, statistics, anaylsis of particu­
lar incidents, case studies, safety training and reali­
stic simulations. These measures to enhance safety cons­
ciousness and its dynamics should be encouraged so that 
learning may take place. In this way something useful may 
come out of the collisions that do occur and other colli­
sions that might occur may be prevented.
4.A.2- TRAINING STRATEGY i
Training should be done in three levels :
Level 1 ; up-d£iting/ re-freshing of seafarers 
knowledge, skill and expertise with respect to new 
technological, environmental, legal and/or other devlop- 
ments. There might be both shore-based and shipboard 
based components to training. It might include on-the-job 
training in new navigational aids or systems, new legal 
requirements or changes in procedures for port or res­
tricted waterway situations.
Level 2 : involves the basics of sound navigational
practices and skill and be carried out to a high profes­
sional standard. This might be called technical training. 
It would be shore-based and require relevant seagoing 
experience. An example of that is the use of simulators.
Level 3 z'Uiould be concerned with safety and
casualty situations. This might be called safety or
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casualty prevention training. It would deal with such 
issues as :
— bridge and shipboard organization,
— effective route planning,
— assessment of risk and risk-taking behaviour,




— human and community relations aboard,
— conflicts between technical and human demands including 
value conflict, and
— the whole subject area of safety consciousness.
Level 4 s This might be called practical training 
in which the human element should be addressed by trai­
ning people for new situations where they have to perform 
several tasks simultaneously, for example navigation 
besides communication or engine trouble. Training should 
also prepare^people to operate systems in various condi­
tions and in teams with varying numbers of members.
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A.S SQHE PRACTICAL MEASURES TO REDUCE RISK ;
GOOD COMMUNICATION AND TEAMWORK
Good communication and teamwork may prevent reliance on 
false assumptions or incorrect data, and in so doing 
avoid some of the often simple misunderstandings which 
are at the root of many human errors and the cause of 
serious accidents.
EMOTIONAL BALANCE AND PERSONAL WELL-BEING
Emotional balance and personal well-being will tend to 
decrease the propensity for hasty and unguarded actions 
or mental short-circuit due to stress or fatigue.
THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATION
The administration should verify how well the technical
rules and verify how well they are complied with.
THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT
Crew stability at junior officer and rating levels is of 
a crucial role. If it can be achieved it will provide a 
greater sense of commitment by the individual, better job 
satisfaction and consequently a great safety awareness. 
After all most collision accidents have the human error 
behind them. If we give people more responsibility and 
trust them to perform a job well, then I believe the har­
vest of heightend responsibility and commitment to the 
objectives which we set out for efficent and safe opera­
tion will be reaped.




End-on collisions do occur when ships are in sight o-f each 
other as well as when in restricted visibility. In this 
paper two cases in clear visibility dealt with and eight 
in restricted visibility.
In fact the number of end—on—col1isions in clear 
visibility are not sufficient to enable me to reach a 
conclusion as to obtain sufficent lessons from them. 
Nevertheless, there are still common causes for these two 
and others which had occurred before the 1972 COLREG came 
into force.
Looking first into the clear visibility cases we find that 
they can be attributed mainly to bad look-out practice on 
one or both ships. In some cases the close presence of a 
third vessel was a contributing factor. The use of a 
whistle and light signals to indicate the manoeuver and 
the attempt to communicate with the other vessel seems not 
to be a common practice. Moreover, when the situation 
becomes dangerous it seems that officers are reluctant to 
use the whistle to warn the other ship<s). When in 
congested areas it is difficult sometimes to do radar 
plotting, yet despite this fact, visual gyro bearings are 
not practiced as an alternative means of plotting.
In end-on-meetings with an initial STBD-to-STBD close 
passing, problems can sometimes arise. If the passing 
distance is about half a mile, a dangerous situation can 
result because one ship will not see the situation as the 
other does. If one feels that it is an acceptable 
STBD-to-STBD passage but the other regards it as a nearly 
reciprocal meeting that requires an alteration to STBD a
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very dangerous situation may develop if one ship takes no 
action and the other turns to STBD at a late stage.
In such circumstances if it is necessary to turn to STBD 
the helm action should be taken in good time. If a port 
turn is considered to be a solution, which is in fact 
against the rules, such action can be taken but early on 
and at a point before the rules would begin to apply. The 
alteration should be sufficient to be recognised by the 
other ship.
R.A.Cahil, In his book "Collisions and their causes" 
comments on "the point before the rules begin to apply":
“The question of attempting to define the point 
at which the Rules begin to apply in any
particular situation is a complex one. It would 
first of all be a matter of speed of closing, 
which would then be translated into distance.
A factor should then be allowed for a reasonable 
amount of time before one would discover an 
alteration of heading of an approaching vessel, 
and next a reasonable amount of time for response.
A minute and a half for both together should be 
reasonable, providing the officer concerned is 
giving his undivided attention to the matter."
I
Once action is taken, whether to alter course or not, the 
latter in case of considering the CPA obtained as a safe 
passing distance, the OOW should not neglect the other 
ship but follow her till it passes clear.
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Secondly, in restricted visibilityi
The investigation shoMed that the high frequency of the 
end-on-collisions in restricted visibility is mainly due 
to the improper use of radar data, associated with a high 
speed of approach. Common features of most of these cases 
are a wrong interpretation of the other vessel’s movement 
and a series of small changes of course which are not 
readily detected.
Many collisions of this category have involved an 
alteration of course to port by one vessel and an 
alteration to STBD by the other, usually at a late stage. 
This is sometimes called the SEA BULL PATTERN
Another category involves only one alteration to STBD by 
one ship as the case mentioned previously in clear 
visibility. The difference here is that normally the 
decision to alter course is based on the radar information 
which is why sometimes it is called Radar Assisted 
Collision, and perhaps in the absence of radar such 
collisions may not have taken place.
To clarify these seemingly predominant two types of action 
the following should be mentioned:
In cases where the bearing of the target changes very 
slowly or not at all^t is of course obvious that close 
quarters will develop if action is not taken. Plotting 
gives one the basic information on which to act to avoid 
such a development.
If the plot shows that the CPA will be to port but at a 
distance considered to be insufficent the simple action
will be an alteration to STBD to increase that distance.
(
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A plot showing a close approach to STBD, however, is a 
problem and here a prompt and bold alteration to STBD 
which will show on the other ship's radar is recommended.
If ARPA is fitted it may solve the problem of plotting, 
but Masters and their officers should not only have 
sufficent training in its use, limitations and errors, but 
also familiarise themselves with the particular ARPA 
equipment onboard. ARPA may quite possibly benefit most 
those who need it least, the competent professional 
mariners.
One of the very important aspects in reducing end-on- 
collisions is the presence of Traffic Separation Schemes 
(TSS). Head on and fine crossing collisions represented 
in the past nearly 90 of collisions in restricted 
visibility. After the introduction of TSS such encounters 
have been reduced and subsequently the end-on-collisions 
were reduced.
So it should be possible to reduce the incidence of this 
type of collision by introducing further traffic 
separation schemes. Some routeing measures, such as those 
in the English Channel, can have a good effect in 
organizing the traffic flow in many parts of the world, 
especially off the coast of Japan where statistics have 
shown a relatively high percentage of collisions. But the 
most important thing here is whWther mariners will make 
use of the TSS properly or not. Governments which have or 
will establish TSS should make sure that vessels use it 
properly.
As we have seen technology and technical advances can help 
to reduce the human involvement as an attempt to reduce 
what is called human error in collision. In spite o-f this 
fact collisions still occur. Thus thae human error problem 
may indeed be irresolvable by purely technical means. It 
seems that "human resource management" in the shipping 
industry is particularly backward and in this area it 
seems that further research must take place if we are to 
reduce casualties at sea.
Finally, it is clear that there is much to learn from 
collisions of the past. We should not wait for our own 
misfortune to occur, rather we should study these cases 
and prevent as many as possible by doing so. We have seen 
also that there are still a lot of obstacles to be 
overcome in order to obtain sufficient collision reports 
from which we can learn.
We are in need of global cooperation as the investigation 
of collisions needs full cooperation between the two flag 
states in cases when collisions involve their ships.
For educators, it is unimportant to know what ship or crew 
member is responsible for collisions. Governments, via 
IMD, can send us the reports without the names of the 
ships concerned. With these reports a simulation of 
collision cases can ^:ake place. We can then check how our 
students are going to behave. Furthermore ^hey can come to 
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Ship 1 sighted ship 2 head-on at initial distance Yo and 
altered course to an angle(0<).
Ship 1 is going with speed of VI
Ship 2 is going with speed o-f V2
A-fter t hours ship 1 arrived at point B, ship 2 
will be at point A.
OB = VI * t and OA = V2 * t 
DC = VI t cosO<
CB = VI t sin DC'
Our aim is to calculate the distance apart <AB> 
and determine the minimum value of AB, which 
represents the CPA.
In order to obtain this value, we need the time t, elapsed 




AB = £ 1CB + AC
[-= <V1 t sinA<) + Yo-(tV2+tVl cos CX 3
AB = (VI t sinCK) + ^o- t (V2 + VI cos^ ‘f
(D ^
r\ £222Vj)= <V1 t sinD<) = VI t sin 0<
i|yo - t <V1 cos CX + V2)J
2 2 2
= Yd - 2Yo t (VI cos ^ + V2) + t (VI cos ^< + V2 )
^ .2 2 2 2 * 7
t(Vl cos C>< + V2 ) = t (VI cosX + 2 VI V2 cosAf + V2 )
2 7 2 2 2 2
= t VI cos^ + 2 VIV2 t cosO< + t V2
Bo by replacing Qf 0;, to the original formula
AB= 2 2 2 Zyi t sin (X + Yo - 2 Yo t (VI cos ^ + V2) +
~ ~ 2. 2 * 2 22 
t yi cos X + 2 VI V2 t cos ^ + t V2
Z 2 Z 2.2 2 z I
V VI t sinO< + t VI CDS X = t VI
J
Z Z 2 2 T 2
t VI + t V2 + Yo - 2 Yo t(Vl cos«< + V2)+ 2 VI V2 t cos^
n i I ——
AB=Jt ( VI +V2 +2V1 V2 cosPC ) - 2 Yo t (VI cos/i^+V2>+ Yo
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d AB/dt = 0
when the distance is minimal
P 2 « f\
d/dt t(Vl +V2 + 2 VI V2 costK ) -2 Yo t (VI CDsft<+V2)+Yo =0 
t 12t ( VI + V2 + 2 VI V2 COS > - 2 Yo (VI coso< + V2 ) = 0
1 Zt (VI + V2 + 2 VI V2 cos fX. ) = Yo ( VI cos IX. + V2 )
Yo ( VI cos ^ + V2 )
t=-----------------------  hours2 2
VI + V2 + 2 VI V2 cosK
multiply by 60 we get tCPA in minutes.
So with the knowledge of own speed, other ship’s speed, 
initial distance and the angle of course alteration we 
can obtain t.
By replacing t in the formula below we can find the 
distance i.e CPA in nautical miles
CPA=
2 2 2
t(Vl +V2 +2 VI V2 cosfx) - 2 Yo t
2
(VI cosoc-f- V2) + Yo
Observe that the values of the coefficients in both 
formulas are very much alike, which simplifies the 
calculations.
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THE USE OF THE TABLES
It can be seen at any moment i-f the speed of the other 
vessel is known, what will be the angle o-f alteration 
required in order to achieve certain CPA or vice versa.
A conclusion is drown when speeds are equal, alteration of 
course 10 degrees will increase the CPA by 0.26 of a mile 
if executed at 3 miles and by 0.52 if done at 6 miles. We 
can conclude also that the separation would be 
proportional1y less if other vessel is faster and greater 
if it is siower.
This table illustrates the bad practice of changing course 
5 degrees as it was the case in many of our collision case 
studies.
The table can be used to assess plotting problems when 
teaching plotting at the school of navigation, as it can 
give a precise result rather the normal brewings.
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^ • • • » UiS Lw4' t-\
* Language ................................... : AmigaBasic 1.2
' Date ................................... t 23 August 1968
' Purpose ................................... t Calculates and prints CPA/tCPA
* ■from meeting distance and
» angle of course-change (deltacrs)
* Used variables











speed own ship in knots
speed target in knots
deltacrs in radians
counter for deltacrs in degrees









coefficient of denominator 
coefficient of numerator
title of table with line






calculates and prints value
LOCATE 10,5:INPUT "Speed own ship in knots -> ";spdl 
LOCATE 12,5;INPUT "Speed other ship in knots -> "}spd2
pi « 4*ATN(1>
' reset printer 
' printer condensed 
' line width printer
LPRINT TAB<5);"Initial";TAB(20)I"Angle of course alteration" j
/nsLPRINT TAB(5)j"Distance";TAB(20);"5";TAB(30>;"10"»TAB(40);"20";TAB(50);"30"; j 




'* « main loops «
» * *
* «**»«««■«■««**«««***«*««*««*»


























sp eed 1 ♦=STR<: (sp d 1) 
speed2:>f STR:!; (spd2)
01 titlel«*="Table 1* CPA<miles) and time to CPA (minutes)"
title2*=" speed own ship + speedl^ + " knots"

























* Oa^v ••«••*•••••••••! 9mI* f*urpo«« •••••••••••••••! Caleulftt** print* CAA/tCAA
* frofli NM*tlng divtanc* and


















(laa to cpa In atnutaa alnca daltacra 
diatanca batMaan vassala
paaatng diatanca
apaad omh ahlp In knota
apaad targat in knota
daltacra In radlana
eountar for daltacra In dagraaa
Initial diatanca batwaan vaaaala
conatant pi
eoafflclant of danoainator 
eoafflelant of nuaarator
tltla of tablo Hith line
prlnta tltla
prtnta horlxontal llna
ealeulataa and prlnta valua
LOCATC 10,S>INPUT •Ppaad Oan lAilp In knota -> *|apdl 
LOCATE 12,Si INPUT *6paad othar ahlp In knota -> *|apd2
pi a fapTNIII
UPPINT CHM(27)*«*| • roaat printar
LPPINT CHRPdSli * printer eondanaad
HtOTH LPPINT 140 • llna aidth printar
W»Ut 1000
LPPINT TMIS)|"tnltlal-tTMI(2Qlt*fbigla of eouraa altaration’
'IPNINT TAPIS*I*01atanca*!TAP(20)$*S*|TAP(30>|* 10*|TAP(40)|*20*|TAP(SO) | *30*| 
LPPINT TAC(M)|*4O*|TAS(70)t*S0*|TAB(S0)|*«O*|TA8(TO)|*7O*|TAP(100)|*e0*tTA£ill 
>1-90*1





















tltlat»>*Tabla li CPA(ailaa) and .tlaa to CPA (atnutaa)" 
tttla2a»* apaad onn ahlp a • * apaadl* ♦ " knota*


















epa-SOR(tcpa*tcpa*coafl-2acoaf2aiepaat nltdt ataln1tdlat) 
tcpa-tcpa*60




Table 1: CPA(ailes) and tiie to CPA (linuteo)
speed ONn ship = 15 knots
speed other ship = IS knots'^
Initial Angle of course alteration
Distance 5 10 20 30 40 .50 60 70 80 90
0.5 0.02/ 1 0.04/ 1 6.09/ 1 0.13/ 1 0.17/ 1 0.21/ 1 0.25/ 1 0.29/ 1 0.32/ 1 0.35/ 1
1.0 0.04/ 2 0.09/ 2 0.17/ 2 0.26/ 2 0.34/ 2 0.42/ 2 0.50/ 2 0.57/ 2 0.64/ 2 0.71/ 2
1.5 0.07/ 3 0.13/ 3 0.26/ 3 0.39/ 3 0.51/ 3 0.63/ 3 0.75/ 3 0.86/ 3 0.96/ 3 1.06/ 3
. 2.0 0.09/ 4 0.17/ 4 0.35/ 4 0.52/ 4 0.68/ 4 0.85/ 4 1.00/ 4 1.15/ 4 1.29/ 4 1.41/ 4
2.5 0.11/ 5 0.22/ 5 0.43/ 5 0.65/ 5 0.86/ 5 1.06/ 5 1.25/ 5 1.43/ 5 1.61/ 5 1.77/ 5
0.13/ 6 0.26/ 6 0.52/ 6 0.78/ 6 1.03/ 6 1.27/ 6 1.50/ 6 1.72/ 6 1.93/ 6 2.12/ 6
3.5 0.15/ 7 0.31/ 7 0.61/ 7 0.91/ 7 1.20/ 7 1.48/ 7 1.75/ 7 2.01/ 7 2.25/ 7 2.47/ 7
4.0 0.17/ 8 0.35/ B 0.69/ 8 1.04/ 8 1.37/ 8 1.69/ 8 2.00/ 8 2.29/ 8 2.57/ 8 2.83/ B
^ 4.5
0.20/ 9 0.39/ 9 0.78/ 9 1.16/ 9 1.54/ 9 1.90/ 9 2.25/ 9 2.58/ 9 2.89/ 9 3.18/ 9
5.0 0.22/10 0.44/10 0.87/10 1.29/10 1.71/10 2.11/10 2.50/10 2.87/10 3.21/10 3.54/10
5.5 0.24/11 0.4B/li • - 0.96/11 1.42/11 1.88/11 2.32/11 2.75/11 3.15/11 3.54/11 3.89/11
A:0 0.26/12 0.52/12 1.04/12 1.55/12 2.05/12 2.54/12 3.00/12 3.44/12 3.86/12 4.24/12
A.5 0.28/13 0.57/13 1.13/13 1.68/13 2.22/13 2.75/13 3.25/13 3.73/13 4.18/13 4.60/13
7.0 0.31/14 0.61/14 1.22/14 1.81/14 2.39/14 2.96/14 3.50/14 4.02/14 4.50/14 4.95/14
7.5 0.33/15 0.65/15 •1.30/15 1.94/15 2.57/15 3.17/15 3.75/15 4.30/15 4.82/15 5.30/15




Tabl^:: CPA(«iIes) and tiae to CPA (ainutes)
speed oen ship « 17 knots^
speed other ship » 21 knots
Initial Angle of course alteration
Distance 5 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90.
O.S 0.02/ 1 0.04/ 1 0.08/ 1 0.12/ 1 0.15/ 1 0.19/ 1 0.22/ 1 0.26/ 1 0.29/ 1 0.31/ 1
1.0 0.04/ 2 0.08/ 2 0.16/ 2 0.23/ 2 0.31/ 2 0.38/ 2 0.45/ 2 0.51/ 2 0.57/ 2 0.63/ 2
1.5 0.06/ 2 . 0.12/ 2 0.23/ 2 0.35/2 0.46/ 2 0.57/ 2 0.67/ 2 0.77/ 2 0.86/ 3 0.94/ 3
2.0 0.08/ 3 0.16/ 3 0.31/ 3 0.46/ 3 0.61/ 3 0.76/ 3 0.89/ 3 1.02/ 3 1.15/ 3 1.26/ 3
2.5 0.10/ 4 0.19/ 4 0.39/ 4 0.58/ 4 0;76/ 4 0.94/ 4 1.12/ 4 1.28/ 4 1.43/ 4 1.57/ 4
33.0 0.12/ 5 0.23/ 5 0.47/ 5 0.69/ 5 0.92/ 5 1.13/ 5 1,34/ 5 1.54/ 5 1.72/ 5 1.89/ 5
3.5 0.14/ 6 0.27/ 6 0.54/ 6 0.81/ 6 1.07/ 6 1.32/ 6 1.56/ 6 1.79/ 6 2.01/ 6 2.20/ 6
4.0 0.16/ 6 0.31/ 6 0.62/ 6 0.93/ 6 1.22/ 6 1.51/ 6 1.79/ 7 2.05/ 7 2.29/ 7 i.iin
V 4.5 0.18/ 7 0.35/ 7 0.70/ 7 1.04/ 7 1.38/ 7 1.70/ 7 2.01/ 7 2.30/ 7 2.58/ 8 2.83/ 8
5.0 0.20/ 8 0.39/ 8 0.78/ 8 1.16/ 8 1.53/ 8 1.89/ 8 2.23/ 8 2.56/ 8 2.86/ 8 3.15/ 9
5.5 0.21/ 9 0,43/ 9 0.85/ 9 1.27/ 9 1.68/ 9 2.08/ 9 2.46/ 9 2.81/ 9 3.15/ 9 3.46/ 9
&.0 0.23/ 9 0.47/ 9 0.93/10 1.39/10 1.83/10 2.27/10 2.68/10 3.07/10 3.44/10 3.78/10
i.5 0.25/10 0.51/10 1.01/10 1.50/10 1.99/10 2.45/10 2.90/11 3.33/11 3.72/11 4.09/11
7.0 0.27/11 0.55/11 1.09/11 1.62/11 2.14/11 2.64/11 3.13/11 3.58/12 4.01/12 4.40/12
7.5 0.29/12 0.58/12 1.17/12 1.74/12 2.29/12 2.83/12 3.35/12 3.84/12 4.30/13 4.72/13




limy j LMn.iyu JirmrfnTnm"?
speed own ship » 5 knots ^
speed other ship « 25 knots
Initial Angle of course alteration
Distance 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Wy
0.5 0.01/ 1 0.01/ 1 0.03/ 1 0.04/ 1 0.06/ 1 0.07/ 1 0.08/ 1 0.09/ 1 0.09/ 1 0.10/ 1
1.0 0.01/ 2 0.03/ 2 0.06/ 2 0.08/ 2 0.11/ 2 0.13/ 2 0.16/ 2 0.17/ 2 0.19/ 2 0.20/ 2
1.5 0.02/ 3 0.04/ 3 0.09/ 3 0.13/ 3 0.17/ 3 0.20/ 3 0.23/ 3 0.26/ 3 0.28/ 3 0.29/ 3
2.0 0.03/ 4 0.06/ 4 0.11/ 4 0.17/ 4 0.22/ 4 0.27/ 4 0.31/ 4 . 0.35/ 4 0.37/ 4 0.39/ 5
2.5 0.04/ 5 0.07/ 5 0.14/ 5 0.21/ 5 0.28/ 5 0.34/ 5 0.39/ 5 0.43/ 5 0.47/ 6 0.49/ 6
(J3.0 0.04/ 6 0.09/ 6 0.17/ 6 0.25/ 6 0.33/ 6 0.40/ 6 0.47/ 6 0.52/ 7 0.56/ 7 0.59/ 7
^.5 0.05/ 7 0.10/ 7 0.20/ 7 0.30/ 7 0.39/ 7 0.47/ 7 0.54/ 7 0.61/ 8 0.65/ 8 0.69/ 8
4.0
ri______
0.06/ B 0.12/ 8 0.23/ B 0.34/ B 0.44/ 8 0.54/ 8 0.62/ 9 0.69/ 9 0.75/ 9 0.78/9
4.5 0.07/ 9 0.13/ 9 0.26/ 9 0.3B/ 9 0.50/ 9 0.61/ 9 0.70/10 0.78/10 0.84/10 O.BB/10
5.0 0.07/10 0.15/10 0.29/10 0.42/10 0.55/10 0.67/10 0.78/11 0.87/11 0.93/11 0.98/12
5.5 0.08/11 0.16/11 0.32/11 0.47/11 0.61/11 0.74/11 0.86/12 0.95/12 1.03/12 1.08/13
6.0 0.09/12 0.17/12 0.34/12 0.51/12 0.66/12 0.81/13 0.93/13 1.04/13 1.12/13 1.18/14
6.5 0.09/13 0.19/13 0.37/13 0.55/13 0.72/13 0.87/14 1.01/14 1.13/14 1.22/15 1.27/15
7.0 0.10/14 0.20/14 0.40/14 0.59/14 0.78/14 0.94/15 1.09/15 1.21/15 1.31/16 1.37/16
7.5 0.11/15 0.22/15 0.43/15 0.64/15 0.83/15 1.01/16 1.17/16 1.30/16 1.40/17 1.47/17










The Effectiveness of Ship Routing 
off North West Europe
A. N. Cockcroft
(Ci^ of London Polytechnic)
I. INTRODUCTION^ Traffic separation was first introduced on a 
voluntary basis in the Dover Strait in September 1967, just over fifteen 
years ago. Compliance with the IMO provisions relating to traffic sepa­
ration schemes has been mandatory for all ships during dfie last five years 
and for some ships for as much as ten years. It may therefore be appro­
priate to assess the effectiveness of routing off North West Europe by 
comparing collision statistics for five-year periods since 195^7.
The results given in the following tables apply only to collisions 
involving trading vessels of over 100 g.r.t. under way and not engaged 
in any special activities. Collisions in harbours, rivers and congested port 
approaches where special circumstances apply are not included. The 
figures quoted for the Dover Strait have been checked against the results 
obtained by the National Maritime Institute but are based on different 
criteria, and there may be some discrepancies.
The area covered is the coastal region from the south-western approaches 
to the Ushant TSS to the approaches to the Elbe including all parts of the 
English Channel and the Dover Strait, but not including waters off the 
East Coast of England which are well clear of the tr^c separation 
schemes and deep-water routes.
The numbers of collisions are based almost entirely on Uoyd^s Weekly' 
Casualy Reports. Information relating to encounter situations is based on 
voyage data supplemented wherever possible by information received 
from additional sources relating to the actual courses steered by each 
vessel. It is not claimed diat the figures constitute a precise record but 
tiiey should provide a good indication of changes in the incidence of 
collision off North West Europe.
2. NORTH SEA COLLISIONS. Table I shows the numbers of col­
lisions for five-year periods since i January 1957 in the southern part of 
the North Sea, east of 2^E., including the deep water routes and the 
traffic separation schemes. During the first part of the 2^-year period, 
before separation schemes were established, there were channels swept 
clear of mines for use by coastal shipping. These Nemedri routes, marked 
by centre-line buoys, provided a form of traffic separation but in periods 
of restricted visibility vessels tended to move into the wrong side of the 
channel and there were numerous collisions.' The swept channels were 
relatively narrow, causing vessels to overtake at close distances.
1*7
identifying ships which are contravening Rule lo of Ae Collision 
Regulations.
Table i. Collisions in the Southern North Sea According
TO ENCOUNTER SITUATION
1962-6 1967-71 1972-6 1977-81
Opposite directions 46 11 11
Broad crossing 7 6 7 9 4
Same direction II 9 6 6 3
Not known lO 8 7 3 Is^
Totals 79 81 66 29 *9
Table i shows diat in the last ten years the incidence of collisions 
between vessels proceeding in opposite directions has decreased to about 
20 per cent of the incidence before routing schemes were established. 
There has also been a reduction of overtaking collisions, which may be 
mainly attributed to the traffic lanes being wider than the swept channels 
of the Nemedri routes.
Figure i shows the location and type of encounter for collisions knovm 
to have occurred in this coastal region in the last five years. Eight of the
1M
ike separauon scnernes, mainly ott the Dutch coast between West 
Hinder and Terschelling. Only one is known to have occurred in the 
long TSS cast of Terschelling. Two of the three reported collisions 
involving vessels proceeding in the same direction occurred in the traffic 
lanes of separation schemes.
3. DOVER STRAIT. Table 2 shows the incidence of collisions in the 
Dover Strait area, extending from the Greenwich meridian to 2° E. but 
excluding the coastal region off east Kent which is well clear of the 
traffic separation scheme.
Table 2. Collisions in the Dover Strait According 
TO Encounter Situation
1957-61 1962-6 1967-71 1972-6 1977-81
Opposite directions 4^ 47 27 7 3
Broad crossing 0 0 0 0 2
Same direction 6 7 8 6 7
Not known i 2 I I 0
Totals 36 »4 I 2
The incidence of collisions between vessels proceeding in opposite 
directions has been reduced to approximately i o per cent of the incidence 
before traffic separation was introduced in this area. There have been no 
collisions between vessels proceeding in opposite directions within the 
traffic lanes since 1972, when the Channel Navigation Information Service 
came into operation.
Only two collisions have occurred between vessels in a broad crossing 
situation, both in the last four years. The incidence of collisions between 
vessels proceeding in the same direction has remained relatively constant.
Figure 2 shows the location and type of collisions in the Dover Strait 
area in the last five years. There have been three cases involving vessels 
proceeding in opposite directions, two in the inshore area off the 
Goodwins and one in the designated inshore traffic zone off the south 
coast of England.
In view of the low incidence of collisions within the designated inshore 
zone there appears to be Httle justification for the new policy of restricting 
its use to vessels calling at a port or pilot station within the zone. 
According to the lastest NMI Report* there were approximately 30 vessels 
per day proceeding through the ITZ in each direction in 1980, only 
about five of which would be calling at a port or pilot station. Approxi­
mately 69 per cent of vessels using the English ITZ have been found to be 
of less than 2000 g.r.t. and are therefore likely to be of relatively low 
speed. Transferring this predominantly low-speed traffic to the lanes is 
likely to increase the number of overtaking encounters by nearly per
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Fig. 2. Location and type of collisions in the Dover Strait 1977-81
cent, which could well result in an overall increase in the incidence of 
collisions.
4. ENGLISH CHANNEL. Table 3 shows rfie number of collisions in 
five-year periods in the English Channel from the Greenwich Meridian 
to 7°W., including the south-western approaches to the Ushant TSS. 
Traffic separation schemes were established off Ushant, Casquets and 
SW England, in 1968, but most of the area is not covered by separation 
schemes. Extensive changes to the separation schemes off Ushant and
Table 3. Collisions in the English Channel According 
TO Encounter Situation
1937-61 1962-6 1967-71 1972-6 1977-81
Opposite directions 20 26 16 17 11
Broad crossing o’ I 2 0 1
Same direction 2 2 4 2 2
Not known I I 0 2 0
Totals 23 30 22 21 *4
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Casquets came into force in July 1979 and further changes were made in 
July 1982.
The decrease in the number of collisions between vessels proceeding in 
opposite directions is less pronounced in this region, but there has been 
no collision of this type within the traffic separation schemes during the 
last five years.
The incidence of collisions between vessels proceeding in the same 
direction is low and there is no apparent trend. There are few cases 
involving vessels in a broad crossing situation.
Fig. 3. Location and type of collisions in the English Channel 1977-81
Figure 3 shows the location and type of collisions which have occurred 
in the region in the last five years. The precise location of two collisions 
between vessels proceeding in opposite directions has not been deter­
mined. Since January 1979 there has been an additional eastbound lane 
in the outer part of the Ushant TSS with a recommended direction of 
traffic flow extending to the north-east for use by tankers and other ships 
fitted with appropriate electronic position-fixing equipment. This arrange­
ment has been criticized as being likely to cause problems with crossing 
traffic west of the Casquets scheme, but so far there has been no report 
of a collision which could be attributed to the revised routing scheme.
Further changes to the routing schemes in the Dover Strait and 
English Channel were made in July 1982. The recommended directions 
of traffic flows and additional navigational aids between the Dover Strait 
and mid-Channel TSS should help to prevent collisions between vessels 
pireceeding in opposite directions in this region. The Ushant TSS is also
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to be changed, probably in 198^, but the new arrangements will not 
necessarily reduce crossing encounters in the western Channel.
CONCLUSION. There has undoubtedly been a considerable im­
provement in traffic safety in this coastal region, which previously had 
the reputation of being the worst area for shipping casualties. What 
further changes are called for? Is there a need for a continuous routing 
scheme extending over the entire region, with a comprehensive inter­
national VTS system?
Any further extension of the traffic separation schemes would involve 
the installation of major floating or fixed navi^tional aids at considerable 
expense and would also impose restrictions on various activities such as 
fishing and offshore oil exploration. However, it may be possible to 
achieve almost the same improvements in appropriate areas by intro­
ducing recommended directions of traffic flow wiA a limited number of 
navigational aids, as in the eastern part of the English Channel.
Extension of radar surveillance would also involve considerable cost 
and does not seem to be justified at the present time. The CNIS is working 
effectively and surveillance is clearly justified in the Dover Strait, but 
it seems doubtful whether any further reduction in the incidence of 
collisions can be achieved by extending shore-based operations. The low 
incidence of collisions in the TSS off Ushant and Castjuets and in the long 
scheme east of Terschelling does not indicate a pressing need for further 
radar coverage.
Particular attention must be paid to the monitoring of large vessels 
carrying hazardous cargoes and to the possibility of reducing uie risk of 
any type of accident to such vessels. Another major casualty causing 
heavy pollution may once again result in hasty action to satisfy outraged 
public opinion which would not necessarily be effective in preventing a 
recurrence.It is doubtful whether any further extension of routing schemes and of 
shore-based operations could make a significant improvement to traffic 
safety in the coastal region of North West Europe. The greatest need is 
for higher standards of manning and training for world-wide shipping to 
improve on-board safety and to ensure that the available equipment and 
facilities are put to effective use.
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